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ARTICLE
INCAPACITATION THROUGH MAIMING:




There are limits to the extent to which a legislatively
represented majority may conduct biological experiments at the
expense of the dignity and personality and natural powers of a
minority-even those who have been guilty of what the
majority define as crimes.'
To be 'cured' against one's will and cured of states which we
may not regard as disease is to be put on a level with those
who have not yet reached the age of reason or those who never
will; to be classed with infants, imbeciles and
domestic animals.'
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INTRODUCTION
In 1642, during his imprisonment for presenting a royalist petition to
the rebellious House of Commons, the cavalier poet Richard Lovelace
wrote the following, now-famous lines:
Stone walls do not a prison make,
Nor iron bars a cage;
Minds innocent and quiet take
That for an hermitage;
If I have freedom in my love
And in my soul am free,
Angels alone, that soar above,
Enjoy such liberty.3
These words have achieved lasting fame because they embody the con-
cept of individual dignity and freedom in the face of state coercion. Even
when locked in a room, with no possessions, no privacy, and no freedom to
come and go as one pleases, Lovelace claims, the prisoner retains a more
fundamental kind of liberty: freedom of "mind," of "soul," and of "love."
That is, the prisoner remains a person, endowed with reason and free will,
the capacity to think, to desire and to make choices-even though the scope
of the prisoner's choices is necessarily constrained by his external circum-
stances. Because the prisoner still possesses the fundamental capacity for
thought and free choice that likens mankind to the "Angels ... that soar
above," he retains the dignity and personhood essential to human
happiness.4
3. Richard Lovelace, To Althea: From Prison, in The Oxford Book of English Verse:
1250-1900 374 (Arthur Quiller-Couch, ed., Oxford U. Press 1919).
4. It is tempting to dismiss Lovelace's claims about the human dignity of the prisoner as the
romantic musings of a poet whose imprisonment was neither very harsh nor very long. Precisely
the same claims were made, however, by Holocaust survivor Viktor Frankl in his description of
life in a Nazi concentration camp:
[Vol. 3:3
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But what if this situation were reversed? What if the state could im-
prison the offender's mind rather than his body? What if it could use medi-
cal technology to destroy the offender's capacity to think certain
undesirable thoughts, or to undertake certain undesirable actions? Such a
prisoner would be free, in the sense that he would no longer be surrounded
by "stone walls" or "iron bars"; but in a deeper sense, he would be en-
slaved, for the state would have transformed the "hermitage" of his mind
into a prison. This is, of course, the stuff of science fiction. Numerous
works-including, for example, 1984,' Brave New World6 and A Clock-
work Orange7-imagine a dystopian future in which the state seeks to con-
trol the minds of its citizens in order to ensure social order.
Unfortunately, this is also the stuff of present-day reality. This year
marks the tenth anniversary of California's enactment of the nation's first
chemical castration law.8 This law requires certain sex offenders to receive,
as part of their punishment, long-term pharmacological treatment involving
massive doses of a synthetic female hormone called medroxyprogesterone
acetate (MPA).9 MPA treatment is described as "chemical castration" be-
cause it mimics the effect of surgical castration by eliminating almost all
testosterone from the offender's system.'0 The intended effect of MPA
treatment is to alter brain and body function by reducing the brain's expo-
sure to testosterone, thus depriving offenders of most (or all) capacity to
experience sexual desire and to engage in sexual activity.'t The procedure
also carries severe side effects, including drastic reduction in sperm count,
irreversible loss of bone mass, diabetes mellitus, pulmonary embolism, and
depression, to name a few.1 2
When California's chemical castration statute was enacted, it was
widely predicted that the law would quickly be struck down as an obvious
example of cruel and unusual punishment. 3 But this law has not been
We who lived in concentration camps can remember the men who walked through the
huts comforting others, giving away their last piece of bread. They may have been few
in number, but they offer sufficient proof that everything can be taken from a man but
one thing: the last of the human freedoms-to choose one's attitude in any given set of
circumstances, to choose one's own way.
Viktor E. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy 75 (Isle Lasch
trans., 3d ed., Simon & Schuster, Inc. 1984).
5. George Orwell, 1984 (Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc. 1949).
6. Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (Perennial Classics 1998).
7. Anthony Burgess, A Clockwork Orange (W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 1987).
8. Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 645 (West 2002).
9. Id. See also discussion infra sec. II.B.I.
10. See infra sec. I.C.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. For examples of the debate surrounding California's chemical castration law in the after-
math of its enactment, see e.g. Kathryn L. Smith, Making Pedophiles Take Their Medicine: Cali-
fornia's Chemical Castration Law, 17 Buff. Pub. Int. L.J. 123 (1998-1999); John S. Murray,
California's Chemical Castration Law: A Model For Massachusetts? 24 New Eng. J. on Crim. &
Civ. Confinement 731 (1998); Philip J. Henderson, Section 645 of the California Penal Code:
20061
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struck down. Rather, over the past ten years, six additional states have en-
acted chemical castration laws.14 There is little evidence that these laws
have even been seriously challenged, much less overturned.' 5 Moreover, we
California's "Chemical Castration" Law-A Panacea or Cruel and Unusual Punishment? 32
U.S.F. L. Rev. 653 (1998); Lisa MacGillivray, California's Mandatory Chemical Castration Pro-
gram for Repeat Sex Offenders: An Analysis of the Legislation Under German and American
Constitutional Law, 21 Suffolk Transnatl. L. Rev. 143 (1997); Kay-Frances Brody, A Constitu-
tional Analysis of California's Chemical Castration Statute, 7 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rights L. Rev.
141 (1997); Avital Stadler, California Injects New Life into an Old Idea: Taking a Shot at Recidi-
vism, Chemical Castration, and the Constitution, 46 Emory L.J. 1285 (1997); Raymond A.
Lombardo, California's Unconstitutional Punishment for Heinous Crimes: Chemical Castration
of Sexual Offenders, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 2611 (1997); Peter J. Gimino, III, Mandatory Chemical
Castration for Perpetrators of Sex Offenses Against Children: Following California's Lead, 25
Pepp. L. Rev. 67 (1997); Mark J. Neach, California is on the "Cutting Edge ": Hormonal Therapy
(a.k.a. "Chemical Castration") is Mandated for Two-Time Child Molesters, 14 Thomas M. Coo-
ley L. Rev. 351 (1997); Kris W. Druhm, A Welcome Return to Draconia: California Penal Law
§ 645, The Castration of Sex Offenders and the Constitution, 61 Alb. L. Rev. 285 (1997).
14. See infra sec. I1.B. The additional states are Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Montana, Oregon,
and Wisconsin. Georgia also enacted a chemical castration law, but repealed it this year for un-
specified policy reasons. Finally, Texas permits sex offenders to petition for surgical castration
under highly circumscribed conditions.
15. The case law regarding chemical castration is exceedingly sparse. See Jackson v. St., 907
So.2d 696 (Fla. 4th Dist. App. 2005) (chemical castration order reversed because trial court failed
to meet statutory requirement that review by medical expert occur within 60 days of sentence);
People v. Steele, 2004 WL 2897955 at *2 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 2004) (finding that defendant had
waived constitutional challenge to chemical castration by falling to raise issue in the trial court,
but noting evidence of an "emerging" societal consensus in favor of chemical castration that might
shield the procedure from Eighth Amendment challenge); Houston v. St., 852 So.2d 425, 428 (Fla.
5th Dist. App. 2003) (chemical castration order reversed because court failed to meet statutory
requirement that it appoint medical expert and specify duration of treatment); People v. Foster,
101 Cal. App. 4th 247, 249 (2002) (defendant who signed plea agreement waived right to chal-
lenge constitutionality of chemical castration sentence); Bruno v. St., 837 So.2d 521, 522 (Fla. 1st
Dist. App. 2003) (plea agreement whereby defendant agreed to reduced sentence in exchange for
undergoing surgical castration was illegal because no Florida statute authorized the imposition of
surgical or chemical castration for the crime of lewd and lascivious conduct). As noted above,
however, there has been considerable scholarly debate regarding the wisdom, morality and/or
constitutionality of the chemical castration laws. See sources cited supra n. 13. See also Caroline
M. Wong, Chemical Castration: Oregon's Innovative Approach to Sex Offender Rehabilitation,
or Unconstitutional Punishment? 80 Or. L. Rev. 267 (2001); Lisa Keesling, Student Author, Prac-
ticing Medicine without a License: Legislative Attempts to Mandate Chemical Castration for Re-
peat Sex Offenders, 32 John Marshall L. Rev. 381 (1999); Larry Helm Spalding, Florida's 1997
Chemical Castration Law: A Return to the Dark Ages, 25 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 117 (1998); Linda
Beckman, Student Author, Chemical Castration: Constitutional Issues of Due Process, Equal
Protection, and Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 100 W. Va. L. Rev. 853 (1998); Bryan Keene,
Chemical Castration: An Analysis of Florida's New "Cutting-Edge" Policy Towards Sex
Criminals, 49 Fla. L. Rev. 803 (1997); Jennifer M. Bund, Did You Say Chemical Castration?, 59
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 157 (1997); Jodi Berlin, Chemical Castration of Sex Offenders: "A Shot in the
Arm" Towards Rehabilitation, 19 Whittier L. Rev. 169 (1997); G.L. Stelzer, Student Author,
Chemical Castration and the Right to Generate Ideas: Does the First Amendment Protect the
Fantasies of Convicted Pedophiles?, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 1675 (1997); Kimberly Peters, Chemical
Castration: An Alternative to Incarceration, 31 Duq. L. Rev. 307 (1993); Edward A. Fitzgerald,
Chemical Castration: MPA Treatment of the Sexual Offender, 18 Am. J. Crim. L. 1 (1990); Wil-
liam Green, Depo-Provera, Castration, and the Probation of Rape Offenders: Statutory and Con-
stitutional Issues, 12 U. Dayton L. Rev. 1 (1986). There has also been debate regarding the
morality, wisdom, and constitutionality of using surgical castration to render sex offenders less
[Vol. 3:3
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are currently facing a new wave of legislative efforts to impose chemical or
surgical castration as a condition for sex offenders' releases from prison.
1 6
Why is this? No doubt, a variety of factors have contributed to the
surprising longevity of the chemical castration laws. Since most criminal
cases are resolved by plea bargain, relatively few prisoners sentenced to
chemical castration have a right to appeal. 7 Moreover, in at least some
states, the chemical castration laws have been inconsistently enforced, fur-
ther reducing the pool of prisoners who have standing to challenge the
laws.18 Finally, where challenges have occurred, the courts appear to have
been able to resolve them on non-constitutional grounds.' 9
Part of the problem, however, may lie in the Eighth Amendment it-
self-or at least in the way it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court.
Although the Court has spent considerable energy determining the circum-
stances under which a state may constitutionally administer the death pen-
alty, it has only rarely had to consider whether a sentence that falls short of
death constitutes inherently cruel punishment.2" Indeed, the Court has not
declared a non-capital sentence to be inherently cruel since it decided Trop
v. Dulles2 almost fifty years ago.
Moreover, the principles the Supreme Court has adopted for determin-
ing whether a punishment is inherently cruel stand in great tension with
each other. The Court has identified the following questions as key to deter-
mining whether a punishment is inherently cruel: (1) whether it violates the
"dignity of man," which is the "basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment";22 (2) whether it violates "evolving standards of decency" ;23
dangerous. See J. Michael Bailey & Aaron S. Greenberg, The Science and Ethics of Castration:
Lessons from the Morse Case, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1225 (1998); Stacy Russell, Castration of
Repeat Sexual Offenders: An International Comparative Analysis, 19 Hous. J. Intl. L. 425 (1997);
Kari A. Vanderzyl, Castration as an Alternative to Incarceration: An Impotent Approach to the
Punishment of Sex Offenders, 15 N. I11. U. L. Rev. 107 (1994).
16. See infra sec. II.C.
17. As of 2002, 95% of state court felony convictions were obtained by guilty plea. See U.S.
Dept. of Just., Bureau of Just. Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, http://
www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5462002.pdf, tbl. 5.46.2002 (Dec. 2004) (looking at felony con-
victions in state courts by offense and method of conviction). See also Foster, 101 Cal. App. 4th at
249 (defendant waived right to challenge constitutionality by signing plea agreement in which he
acknowledged that chemical castration was a possible sentence, and agreed to waive right to
appeal conviction and sentence generally).
18. See discussion infra sec. H.C.1.
19. See cases cited infra sec. I.C.
20. A punishment can be "cruel and unusual," even if it is not inherently cruel, if it is either
grossly disproportionate to the offense, see Coker v. Ga., 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) ("[A] sentence
of death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape."), or is an
impermissible punishment based on status rather than the commission of a criminal act. See
Robinson v. Cal., 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Neither of these types of cruel and unusual punishment is
directly relevant to the present discussion.
21. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
22. Id. at 100 (plurality) ("The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing
less than the dignity of man."). See also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) ("By pro-
2006]
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(3) whether it involves the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" 24-
that is, pain that completely fails to further either retributive, deterrent, in-
capacitative or rehabilitative goals;25 and (4) whether it involves "torture"
or "barbarous" methods of punishment, such as drawing and quartering,
burning at the stake, or castration.26
The Supreme Court has given very little guidance as to how these prin-
ciples are supposed to relate to each other, and therefore, it is not entirely
clear how a court would rule if it had to decide an Eighth Amendment
challenge to the chemical castration laws. 27 Are "human dignity" and con-
temporary "standards of decency" independent values, or does human dig-
nity simply mean "whatever is acceptable by contemporary standards"? 28
tecting even those convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the
government to respect the dignity of all persons."); Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 138 (2003)
("[I]t remains true that the 'restraints and the punishment which a criminal conviction entails do
not place the citizen beyond the ethical tradition that accords respect to the dignity and intrinsic
worth of every individual.'") (internal citations omitted); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738
(2002); Atkins v. Va., 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 11 (1992);
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978); Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976); Gregg v. Ga., 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976); Furman v. Ga., 408
U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). Cf. Woodson v. N.C., 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)
(plurality) ("[I]n capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the
circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of
inflicting the penalty of death.").
23. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101. See also e.g. Roper, 543 U.S. at 561.
24. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
25. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 737 ("unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain" means pain
inflicted "totally without penological justification."); Ewing v. Cal., 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (States
are free to choose their own penological justification, including "incapacitation, deterrence, retri-
bution, or rehabilitation.") (citing Harmelin v. Mich., 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
26. See e.g. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169 (citing Anthony Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Inflicted: The Original Meaning, 57 Cal. L. Rev. 839, 852-53 (1969)); Wilkerson v.
Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1878) (citing drawing and quartering and burning at the stake as exam-
ples of impermissibly cruel punishment); Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349, 377 (1910) (citing castra-
tion as an example of inherently cruel punishment).
27. The relative lack of coherence in the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
has led to a remarkable level of instability and unpredictability in its case law. For example, in
1980, the Court upheld a recidivist statute that caused a life sentence to be imposed on a small-
time offender convicted of his third offense, Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), then struck
down, in 1983, a life sentence for a similar offender under a similar recidivist statute, Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), then upheld, in 2003, a sentence of 25 years to life for a similar
offender under California's "three strikes" law, Ewing, 538 U.S. at 11. Similarly, the Court held,
in 1989, that it did not violate the Eighth Amendment to execute a mentally retarded person
convicted of murder, Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), or a minor over the age of 15,
Stanford v. Ky., 492 U.S. 361 (1989). Both of these decisions were overruled less than 16 years
later. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304 and Roper, 543 U.S. at 551.
28. The relationship between "human dignity" and "evolving standards of decency" appears
to have changed significantly since these principles were first announced. In Trop v. Dulles, the
Supreme Court announced both that the "dignity of man" is the essential foundation of the Eighth
Amendment, and that the Eighth Amendment should be interpreted in accordance with "evolving
standards of decency"-but it did not directly tie these two ideas together. See Trop, 356 U.S. at
100-01. The Supreme Court initially treated these two concepts as separate criteria for determin-
(Vol. 3:3
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Similarly, are "barbarous" punishments (such as torture) always unaccept-
able, or do they only become unacceptable if they completely fail to further
any penological goal? The answer to these questions will largely determine
whether the chemical castration laws ultimately stand or fall. As the discus-
sion in Part III, below, will demonstrate, chemical castration is a form of
punishment that clearly denies the basic human dignity of sex offenders.
Given the great public hatred of sex offenders, however, it is less clear that
this punishment violates contemporary "standards of decency."29 Similarly,
as will be shown below, chemical castration is highly similar to the quintes-
sentially "barbarous" punishment, physical castration. But like other "bar-
barous" forms of punishment, it may also be effective in furthering
penological goals, such as deterrence and incapacitation.3"
This article will argue that the most effective and appropriate way to
determine the relationship between these interpretive principles is to refer
them back to the text of the Eighth Amendment, and particularly to the
word "cruel." The word "cruel" is generally taken to mean "indifference to
or pleasure in another's distress."3 1 As this definition indicates, a "cruel"
punishment is not necessarily the same thing as a punishment that "fails to
ing the constitutionality of a given punishment. For example, in Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173, the
plurality held: "Public perceptions of standards of decency with respect to criminal sanctions are
not conclusive. A penalty also must accord with 'the dignity of man,' which is the 'basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment.'" More recently, however, the Supreme Court has tended to
write as though the requirements of human dignity are synonymous with contemporary public
"standards of decency." See e.g. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12. Justice O'Connor has, perhaps un-
consciously, provided the most succinct illustration of the contemporary Court's conflation of
these two concepts, by referring to our country's "evolving understanding of human dignity."
Roper, 543 U.S. at 605 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The potential practical consequences of the
Court's movement from the TroplGregg approach to the contemporary approach are enormous.
The TroplGregg approach implies that, at a minimum, human dignity provides an Eighth Amend-
ment baseline to protect offenders if public opinion should take a turn toward the harsh and the
cruel. Under the contemporary approach, by contrast, the term "human dignity" has no apparent
independent meaning. It is whatever public opinion says it is. Such an approach provides little
protection when current notions of human dignity become debased, and the public becomes more
willing to subject offenders to dehumanizing punishments, such as chemical or surgical castration.
29. In Steele, 2004 WL 2897955 at *2 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 2004), the appellate court stated
that it might uphold California's chemical castration law against an Eighth Amendment challenge
on the ground that a "societal consensus" had emerged in favor of this mode of punishment.
Ultimately, however, the Court declined to reach the constitutional issue because the defendant
had waived it.
30. See discussion infra sec. I.C. There is fairly strong evidence that surgical castration will
reduce recidivism rates, but it is much less clear that this principle holds true for chemical castra-
tion. Specifically, as discussed below, chemical castration imposes severe side effects on sex
offenders, which lead, in turn, to high drop-out rates. Once an offender stops receiving MPA
treatment, the sex drive appears to return, and the offender becomes dangerous once again. Al-
though the wisdom of utilizing chemical castration to protect public safety is beyond the scope of
this article, it seems at least arguable that chemical castration laws may harm public safety by
lulling the public into a false sense of security with respect to sex offenders who have been
released on the condition that they be chemically castrated. For a bizarre and tragic example of the
public safety problem this creates, see infra n. 104.
31. Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed., Oxford U. Press 1989).
2006]
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further a penological purpose"; nor is it necessarily the same thing as a
punishment that is not acceptable under current "standards of decency."
Rather, the word "cruel" implies a certain relationship between the punisher
and the person punished: an attitude that the suffering of the person pun-
ished is either unimportant, or is something to be positively enjoyed. In
other words, a cruel punishment is one that treats the offender as though he
or she were not a human person with a claim to our concern as fellow
persons, but as a mere animal or thing lacking in basic human dignity.
This definition of the word "cruel" clarifies that human dignity must
be the primary focus of our analysis of the "cruel and unusual punishments"
clause. Nonconformity with current standards of decency, or failure to fur-
ther a penological purpose, may serve as evidence that a given punishment
is unacceptably cruel. Similarly, a punishment's likeness to a "barbarous"
form of punishment may help us determine whether it violates the Eighth
Amendment. But the key question is whether the punishment treats the of-
fender in a manner that accords with the dignity of the human person.
This question, in turn, requires us to focus on the fundamental differ-
ence between persons and things.32 Persons differ from things in at least
two ways. First, as the quote from Richard Lovelace indicates, a person
generally possesses a measure of reason and free will-an interior realm of
freedom that is beyond the reach of the state.33 Second, a person has a claim
to our concern as fellow persons, and has a right to be treated as an end in
herself.34 A thing has no claim to our concern, and may be used exclusively
for the purposes of others.
If the Eighth Amendment stands for the proposition that offenders
must be treated as persons rather than things, this implies that punishment
must satisfy at least two requirements to be constitutional: First, it must not
be designed to control or negate the interior capacities of the defendant
considered most integral to human dignity, such as reason and free will.36
32. The moral distinction between persons and things has been most famously described by
Immanuel Kant: "Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature's, have neverthe-
less, if they are irrational beings, only a relative value as means, and are therefore called things;
rational beings, on the contrary, are called persons, because their very nature points them out as
ends in themselves." Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, in
Basic Writings of Kant 143, 185-86 (Allen W. Wood ed., Modem Library 2001).
33. Lovelace, supra n. 3.
34. Kant, supra n. 32.
35. Id.
36. As will be discussed more fully below, chemical castration differs from traditional modes
of punishment, such as incarceration, in that it involves a direct imposition by the state on an
offender's capacity to make choices that are not to the state's liking. To be sure, one of the key
traditional purposes of incarceration is to influence offender behavior, either through rehabilitation
or specific deterrence. Nonetheless, as the quote from Viktor Frankl, supra n. 4, indicates, even
the harshest forms of incarceration still leave the offender a basic capacity to make choices.
Chemical castration, by contrast, involves direct biological intervention on the inner workings of
the brain. Thus, it does not involve a coercive attempt to persuade the offender to conform to the
law, but rather takes away his very capacity to choose otherwise.
[Vol. 3:3
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Second, it must not impose conditions that treat the offender's suffering as
either a matter of indifference, or something to be enjoyed. Harsh punish-
ment may comport with human dignity, so long as the harshness does not
exceed the offender's actual desert. But punishment that assaults the very
personhood of the offender, or treats the offender's suffering as an unimpor-
tant (or even desirable) thing in and of itself, violates the Eighth Amend-
ment because it denies the inherent dignity and personhood of the
offender.37 Chemical castration fails to meet both of these requirements.
First, the very purpose of chemical castration is to exert control over
the mind of the offender by drastically reducing the brain's exposure to
testosterone, a hormone which is considered crucial to the "regulation of
sexuality, aggression, cognition, emotion and personality" in men and is
"the major activator element of sexual desire, fantasies and behavior." '38
The procedure is sometimes justified on the ground that some sex offenders
are pedophiles who experience deviant (and often unwanted) sexual desire
for children, and that for this group of offenders, chemical castration is a
beneficial form of medical treatment. This argument fails, however, because
the vast majority of sex offenders covered by the chemical castration laws
do not have any sexual disorder, much less pedophilia.39 Many of these
offenders may be incorrigibly bad, dangerous or antisocial people, but they
do not suffer from a sexual sickness.4" Thus, subjecting them to chemical
37. See discussion infra sec. III.A. Although the current article does not concern capital pun-
ishment, it is impossible to discuss the "human dignity" standard without at least briefly consider-
ing its applicability to the death penalty. Justice Brennan, both in his concurrence in Furman v.
Ga., and in numerous subsequent dissents, strongly voiced the opinion that the death penalty is so
violative of human dignity as to violate the Eighth Amendment. Furman, 408 U.S. at 286. The
Supreme Court rejected this view, however, in Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153. Although my purpose here
is not to defend capital punishment, this practice can be distinguished from chemical castration in
at least two ways. First, unlike chemical castration, capital punishment does not treat the suffering
of the offender as a matter of indifference. The Supreme Court has always held that it is impermis-
sible for the state to draw out the length or the painfulness of an offender's execution. See e.g. In
re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) ("Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as used
in the constitution [sic]."); cf Hill v. McDonough, 126 S. Ct. 2096, 2012-13 (2006) (permitting
death row inmate to bring § 1983 suit challenging state's lethal injection procedure as an unduly
painful method of execution). By contrast, as discussed in sec. I.C, infra, chemical castration
imposes severe side effects, including depletion of bone mineral density, that may have the effect
of imposing a lingering, torturous death on the offender. Second, although capital punishment
ends the life of the offender, it does not permit the state to exert control over the inner workings of
the offender's brain and body during her lifetime. The very purpose of chemical castration is to
permit the state to exert such control. In other words, the offender subjected to capital punishment
continues to be "herself' up until the moment her life ends; in a real sense, the offender subjected
to chemical castration does not.
38. Ariel Rosler & Eliezer Witztum, Phannacotherapy of Paraphilias in the Next Millen-
nium, 18 Behavioral Sci. L. 43, 45 (2000). The "mind control" aspect of chemical castration has
also led some to question whether it violates a First Amendment right to "mentation." See e.g.
Stelzer, supra n. 15, at 1707.
39. See discussion infra sec. I.A.
40. See id.
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castration is not even arguably medically appropriate. Rather, it merely re-
places the "stone walls" and "iron bars" of a traditional prison (where many
sex offenders doubtless belong) with a less expensive but more degrading
prison for the mind.4
Second, chemical castration constitutes a profound physical assault on
sex offenders. By pumping massive doses of female hormones into a male
body, this procedure subjects offenders to severe physical effects, some of
which appear quite likely to have painful, disabling, and possibly fatal long-
term consequences.42 To take the most troubling example, long term MPA
treatment depletes bone mineral density, so that offenders appear likely to
experience osteoporosis and multiple bone fractures as a result of their
treatment.43 Thus, over the long-term, chemical castration will cease to be
merely disabling, and may become something more like torture. The choice
of this extraordinarily harmful mode of punishment implies that the health
and well-being of sex offenders are simply not important.
Because chemical castration is designed both to shackle the mind and
cripple the body of sex offenders, it is doubly cruel, and should be struck
down as a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
In Part I of this article, I will examine what we know-and do not
know-about sex offenders, recidivism, and chemical castration. Part II
will describe the political climate and purposes that gave rise to the chemi-
cal castration laws, analyze their key provisions, and set forth the issues that
have surrounded attempts to implement these laws over the past ten years.
Finally, in Part III, I will argue that chemical castration is an inherently
cruel punishment that denies human dignity because it interferes with brain
function in a manner that turns the brain itself into a kind of prison, and
because it subjects sex offenders to severe physical and mental harm.
41. Of course, the state has previously tried the coercive use of medical technology to control
despised groups, and not very long ago. Over the course of several decades during the twentieth
century, tens of thousands of criminals and persons with mental illnesses or deficiencies were
"rehabilitated" by means of involuntary sterilization. See eg. Philip R. Reilly, The Surgical Solu-
tion: A History of Involuntary Sterilization in the United States 94 (John Hopkins U. Press 1991)
(citing statistics indicating that between 1907 and 1963, more than sixty thousand people were
sterilized under involuntary sterilization laws); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding
law permitting involuntary sterilization of feebleminded individuals housed in state facilities, in
order to prevent the propagation of feebleminded offspring); Skinner, 316 U.S. at 535 (striking
down law providing for involuntary sterilization of habitual criminals, to prevent them from prop-
agating criminal offspring). Like the chemical castration laws, the states' use of lobotomies and
sterilizations reflected a desire to control those whom society despises, rather than treat them (and
punish them, where appropriate) with justice and dignity. We now condemn practices such as
involuntary sterilization or lobotomization, because they did not truly rehabilitate their recipients,
but maimed them, robbing them of personal capacities such as the ability to procreate or to think
and perceive without unwanted impediments. For further information on the Eugenics movement
and the sterilization laws, see e.g. Daniel J. Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the
Uses of Human Heredity (Alfred A. Knopf 1985); Edward J. Larson, Sex, Race and Science:
Eugenics in the Deep South (Johns Hopkins U. Press 1995).
42. See infra sec. I.C.
43. See id.
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I. SEX OFFENDERS AND CHEMICAL CASTRATION
A. What Do We Know about Sex Offenders?
The popular perception of the sex offender is that of the predatory
pedophile-a man who is driven by an uncontrollable lust for children, and
who may victimize dozens (or even hundreds) of children if not incapaci-
tated.' Such offenders do exist, and are exceedingly dangerous.4 5 But that
group comprises only a small (though highly publicized) percentage of the
whole.
Sex offenders generally are a highly heterogeneous group. Researchers
have not been able to create a consistent "offender profile,""6 nor identify a
root cause that explains all (or even most) sex offenses.47 Indeed, one group
of researchers has recently observed that "our current understanding is no
more than the trivial recitation that offenders are created by both nature and
nurture."' 8
Researchers are, however, increasingly coming to a consensus that the
personal characteristics of sex offenders, as a group, are similar to those of
criminal offenders generally."9 Like other criminal offenders, many sex of-
fenders have an "antisocial orientation"-that is, they are impulsive, lack
self-control, are oriented toward short-term rewards (despite long-term neg-
ative consequences), have pro-offense attitudes, associate with other
criminals, and lack empathy for victims.5" Additionally, many sex offenders
have alcohol or drug abuse problems.5' Indeed, the recognized psychiatric
disorder most common among sex offenders is "antisocial personality disor-
der," a condition characterized by "a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and
44. See infra sec. H.A.
45. See e.g. Barry M. Maletzky & Gary Field, The Biological Treatment of Dangerous Sex-
ual Offenders, A Review and Preliminary Report of the Oregon Pilot Depo-Provera Program, 8
Aggression & Violent Behavior 391, 392 (2003) (noting that a subgroup of sexual offenders "can
be characterized by a predatory pattern; the creation of multiple victims; the commission of more
aggressive crimes; often, the presence of attraction to boys; and frequently, the existence of cen-
tral nervous system (CNS) dysfunction or psychiatric disabilities resulting in deficient impulse
control").
46. Leam A. Craig, Kevin D. Browne, Ian Stringer & Anthony Beech, Sexual Recidivism: A
Review of Static, Dynamic and Actuarial Predictors, 11 J. Sexual Aggression 65, 79 (2005)
("[D]ue to the heterogeneous nature of this group of offenders, there is no current consistent
profile of the sex offender.").
47. Raymond M. Wood, Linda S. Grossman & Christopher G. Fichtner, Psychological As-
sessment, Treatment, and Outcome with Sex Offenders, 18 Behavioral Sci. L. 23, 26 (2000)
("[W]e do not have comprehensive etiological theories regarding sexual offenses or sexual
offenders.").
48. Id. at 37.
49. See id. (Research is beginning to indicate that "the more operative term in sex offender is
'offender,' and that theories developed to explain general criminal behavior will increase our
understanding of sexually criminal behavior.").
50. See e.g. Leonore M. J. Simon, An Examination of the Assumptions of Specialization,
Mental Disorder, and Dangerousness in Sex Offenders, 18 Behavioral Sci. L. 275, 294 (2000).
51. See id.
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violation of, the rights of others that begins in childhood or early adoles-
cence and continues into adulthood."52 The possession of antisocial charac-
teristics is strongly predictive, not just of sex offenses, but of criminal
conduct generally.53
Sex offenders who are convicted of victimizing children appear to be
similarly heterogeneous 4.5  For example, in a recent study of 142 convicted
child molesters in Arizona, only 8.5% were diagnosed with pedophilia55
The most common personality disorder among this group was antisocial
personality disorder (12%).56 Nearly a quarter of the child molesters were
diagnosed as alcoholics (23.2%), and about 10% had drug abuse
problems.57
B. What Do We Know about Sex Offender Recidivism?
It is difficult to measure recidivism with any precision, as offenders
are unlikely to self-report, and many offenses go undetected. Nonetheless,
the data we have indicates that, as a class, sex offenders are relatively un-
likely to commit future sexual offenses, and actually pose a greater risk of
committing future non-sexual offenses. For example, according to two re-
cent meta-studies involving nearly 60,000 sex offenders, the sexual recidi-
52. Am. Psychiatric Assn., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 701 (4th
ed., Am. Psychiatric Assn. 2000). See also Simon, supra n. 50, at 294 ("Instead of possessing a
mental disorder, the results suggest that many child molesters may be antisocial. Consistent with
the antisocial character of general offenders, convicted child molesters are likely to possess sub-
stance abuse problems and varied nonsex criminal records.").
53. See e.g. Simon, supra n. 50, at 277-78 ("[T]he majority of criminal offenders, including
offenders who commit sex crimes, meet at least some of the criteria for antisocial personality
disorder, a chronic disorder that rarely begins in adulthood and for which there exists no effective
treatment."); R. Karl Hanson & Kelly E. Morton-Bourgon, The Characteristics of Persistent Sex-
ual Offenders: A Meta-Analysis of Recidivism Studies, 73 J. Consulting & Clinical Psychol. 1154,
1158 (2005) ("The major predictors of general (any) and violent recidivism [among sex offenders]
were variables related to antisocial orientation, such as antisocial personality, antisocial traits, and
a history of rule violation. These are the same risk factors that predict general and violent recidi-
vism among mentally disordered offenders ... and unselected groups of offenders.").
54. The precise prevalence of pedophilia among child molesters is difficult to determine be-
cause comprehensive efforts to study this issue have been lacking. See T. Howard Stone, William
J. Winslade & Craig M. Klugman, Sex Offenders, Sentencing Laws and Pharmaceutical Treat-
ment: A Prescription for Failure, 18 Behavioral Sci. L. 83, 87 (2000) ("[O]f the data that is
collected, no insight is provided as to whether offenders are known to have a pedophilia disorder:
the criteria currently used to measure sex offenses involving children as victims or to base a
criminal conviction thereupon under state laws [djo not include such a finding.").




HeinOnline  -- 3 U. St. Thomas L. J. 570 2005-2006
INCAPACITATION THROUGH MAIMING
vism rate was between 13 and 14% over a 5-year period.58 The overall
recidivism rate for the same group was over 36%.19
Although the general risk of sexual recidivism is relatively low, two
factors are associated with greatly increased risk: the presence of "deviant
sexual interests," or paraphilia, and the presence of antisocial orientation.
61
Deviant sexual interests have been described as "enduring attractions
to sexual acts that are illegal (e.g., sex with children, rape) or highly unu-
sual (e.g., fetishism, autoerotic asphyxia)."'" The American Psychiatric As-
sociation describes this condition as paraphilia. To be diagnosed as a
paraphiliac, the subject must experience "recurrent, intense sexually arous-
ing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors generally involving (1) nonhuman
objects, (2) the suffering or humiliation of oneself or one's partner, or (3)
children or other nonconsenting persons that occur over a period of at least
6 months" and that cause "clinically significant distress or impairment in
social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning. '6 2 With re-
spect to child molestation, the form of paraphilia that creates the greatest
risk of recidivism is pedophilia, which is characterized by intense, recurrent
fantasies and urges concerning sex with prepubertal children.63
Sex crimes are, by their very nature, sexually deviant. But the commis-
sion of a sex offense is not, in itself, sufficient to classify an offender as a
paraphiliac. 6 As noted above, the data indicate that most child molesters
and rapists are not, in fact, paraphiliacs. 65 For nonparaphiliac offenders, the
sex offense is a crime of opportunity rather than an expression of an endur-
ing preference for a deviant form of sexual conduct.
The second major risk factor, antisocial orientation, involves charac-
teristics that many sex offenders share with criminals generally: impulsiv-
ity, unemployment, a history of substance abuse, a history of rule violation,
58. See Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, supra n. 53, at 1158 (13.7%); R. Karl Hanson &
Monique T. Bussiere, Predicting Relapse: A Meta-Analysis of Sexual Offender Recidivism Stud-
ies, 66 J. Consulting & Clinical Psychol. 348, 351 (1998) (13.4%).
59. See Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, supra n. 53, at 1158 (36.2%); Hanson & Bussiere, supra
n. 58, at 351 (36.3%). Cf Simon, supra n. 50, at 283 ("Among those researchers who measure
versatility of offending, though, there is a consensus that the pure sex offender is a rarity; instead,
sex offenses are single or infrequent and often are embedded in an extensive criminal history of
property and violent crimes.").
60. E.g. Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, supra n. 53, at 1154; Craig et al., supra n. 46, at 79 ("A
review of the studies on sexual recidivism reveals a consistent pattern of prior criminal history,
deviant sexual interests, personality disorders and extrafamilial male victims as being positively
associated with sexual recidivism.").
61. Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, supra n. 53, at 1154.
62. Am. Psychiatric Assn., supra n. 52, at 566.
63. See id. at 571; Stone et al., supra n. 54, at 90.
64. Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, supra n. 53, at 1154 ("Although all sexual offending is
socially deviant, men who commit such acts do not necessarily have enduring preferences for such
behavior."); Stone et al., supra n. 54, at 91 ("Nor would an incidence of child sexual abuse or a
sex offense involving a child as a victim suffice to diagnose a perpetrator as a pedophile.").
65. See supra nn. 54-57 and accompanying text.
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pro-offense attitudes, association with other criminals, etc.66 When these
characteristics are sufficiently strong and persistent, they are sometimes
classified as "antisocial personality disorder."67
It appears that deviant sexual interests (i.e. paraphilia) and antisocial
orientation are independent risk factors. That is, each creates a risk of recid-
ivism for reasons unrelated to the risk posed by the other. Paraphiliacs are
at high risk of re-offending because they have an enduring sexual prefer-
ence for illegal conduct (e.g., sex with children, sexual torture, etc.), com-
bined with compulsive fantasies and urges related to this illegal conduct.68
Persons with antisocial orientations, on the other hand, pose a risk because
of their general willingness to violate the rights of others.69 They may not
prefer to achieve sexual gratification through rape or child molestation, but
they are willing to do so if the opportunity arises.7" Of course, some offend-
ers are both antisocial and paraphiliac. Such offenders appear to pose a very
great risk of recidivism.71
C. What Do We Know about Chemical Castration?
Medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA) is a synthetic female hormone
marketed under the trade name Depo-Provera. MPA has been FDA-ap-
proved for use by women as a contraceptive, and its manufacturer (Pfizer)
has warned that the product "is indicated only for the prevention of preg-
nancy."72 The FDA has not approved MPA for use in men, for any purpose,
because there have been no long-term clinical trials that show it to be safe
and effective for men.73 Nonetheless, once a drug has been approved for a
particular use, the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act permits doctors to pre-
scribe it for unapproved uses as well.74 Thus, over the last several decades,
66. E.g. Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, supra n. 53, at 1154.
67. See supra n. 52 and accompanying text.
68. See Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, supra n. 53, at 1154.
69. Id.
70. Furthermore, studies indicate that the presence of sexual deviancy does not increase the
risk of nonsexual recidivism. See e.g. id. at 1158.
71. Maletzky & Field, supra n. 45, at 392.
72. Pfizer, Depo-Provera CI Label 2, http:/fwww.fda.gov/medwatchtSAFETYI2004Depo
ProverajLabel.pdf (Nov. 2004) [hereinafter FDA Label].
73. See e.g. Fabian M. Saleh & Fred S. Berlin, Sex Hormones, Neurotransmitters, and
Psychopharmacological Treatments in Men with Paraphilic Disorders, 12 1. Child Sexual Abuse
233, 240 (2003) (noting that MPA and similar hormone therapies "are not approved by the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration" for suppressing male sex drive because they have "not been ade-
quately studied" in this context).
74. See Fitzgerald, supra n. 15, at 6 n. 24 ("Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,
a manufacturer can only label, promote, and advertise a drug for the uses which the drug has been
proved to be safe and effective. This requires the manufacturer to submit the drug for clinical
trials, the results of which will be reviewed by the Food and Drug Administration. Once a drug
has been marketed, the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act does not limit the manner in which a doctor
may present the drug. Such 'unapproved' or 'unlabelled' uses are reported in the scientific jour-
nals and become part of accepted therapies. If the manufacturer is so inclined, he may then un-
(Vol. 3:3
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a number of doctors have studied using MPA as a kind of treatment for
paraphiliacs.75 The typical dosage for paraphiliacs ranges from 100 mg/
week to 500 mg/week,76 whereas the recommended dosage for use as a
female contraceptive is "150 mg ... every 3 months (13 weeks). 7 7 In other
words, the dosage used to eliminate male sex drive is anywhere from 8.6 to
43.3 times the recommended dose for use as a female contraceptive-a fact
which is potentially significant in light of MPA's severe side effects (dis-
cussed below).
When used in men, MPA works as an antiandrogen that "reduces the
production and effects of testosterone, 78 and causes testosterone to be me-
tabolized (and thus eliminated from the system) more quickly.79 The overall
effect is to "[reduce] the level of androgen in the blood stream to that of a
prepubescent male.""0
MPA acts directly on the brain by drastically reducing its exposure to
testosterone.Y' Testosterone is considered crucial to the "regulation of sexu-
ality, aggression, cognition, emotion and personality," and is "the major
activator element of sexual desire, fantasies and behavior." '82 By reducing
the brain's exposure to testosterone, MPA suppresses "sexual fantasies, sex-
ual urges, and sexual drive,"83 and thus induces a state of "erotic apathy."84
It has the same effect on "both deviant and non-deviant sexual behavior.
85
No one knows what causes a person to develop a paraphilic disorder
such as pedophilia.86 It is fairly clear, however, that paraphiliacs do not
have abnormal levels of testosterone.87 Nonetheless, because this disorder is
characterized by recurrent, intense (and often unwanted) thoughts and urges
dergo the requirements to have the drug approved for the new usage under 21 CF ch. 1, pt. 312 (4-
1-88 edition).").
75. Maletzky & Field, supra n. 45, at 397-98.
76. Saleh & Berlin, supra n. 73, at 242.
77. FDA Label, supra n. 72, at Dosage and Administration.
78. Fitzgerald, supra n. 15, at 2-3.
79. See Fitzgerald, supra n. 15, at 6 ("MPA inhibits the release of the follicle-stimulating
hormone and the luteinizing hormone from the anterior pituitary gland in the brain. This results in
a decrease in testosterone production in the testicles. MPA interferes with the effects of the testos-
terone and accelerates the metabolism of testosterone in the body."). See also Saleh & Berlin,
supra n. 73, at 241.
80. Fitzgerald, supra n. 15, at 6.
81. See id. ("MPA, like all progestinic hormones, acts directly on the brain.").
82. Rosler & Witztum, supra n. 38, at 45.
83. Stone et al., supra n. 54, at 96. See also Saleh & Berlin, supra n. 73, at 241 (asserting that
MPA "suppresses sexual drive and thereby reduces the intensity and frequency of deviant sexual
urges and cravings").
84. Fitzgerald, supra n. 15, at 7 (quoting P. Walker, W. Meyer, L. Emory, & A. Rubin,
Antiandrogenic Treatment of the Paraphilias, in Guidelines for the Use of Psychotropic Drugs
435 (1984)).
85. Stone et al., supra n. 54, at 96.
86. See Saleh & Berlin, supra n. 73, at 234 (noting that "the etiology and pathophysiology of
the paraphilias is still under investigation").
87. Rosler & Witztum, supra n. 38, at 45.
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concerning sex with children, some have considered MPA-induced suppres-
sion of testosterone to be a promising option for paraphiliacs. By disabling
the sex drive, MPA is supposed to provide the paraphiliac "relief from his
compulsive fantasy. Formerly insistent and commanding urges can be vol-
untarily controlled."88 Once the compulsive fantasies are eliminated, the
thinking goes, the paraphiliac should be "more amenable to psychotherapy
that can enable him to adjust to a new lifestyle." 89
Prior research concerning surgical castration has given researchers rea-
son to believe that its chemical analogue would be effective. Like chemical
castration, surgical removal of the testes has the effect of eliminating virtu-
ally all testosterone from the system, and thus disabling the sex drive.9"
During the Nazi era, the German government surgically castrated all sex
offenders convicted of certain crimes.9' A follow-up study of this group of
offenders indicated a recidivism rate of 2.3%.92 Similarly, in the 1970s, the
Federal Republic of Germany permitted sex offenders to agree to surgical
castration in return for reduced sentences. 93 An eleven-year follow-up study
was conducted on two groups of offenders: those who underwent the treat-
ment, and those who initially volunteered, but backed out.94 The recidivism
rate for the castrated group was 3%, as compared to 46% for the uncastrated
group.95 Other European countries employed surgical castration on sex of-
fenders during the middle decades of the twentieth century, with similar
levels of success.96
Chemical castration via MPA seems to hold the promise of reducing
recidivism to the same extent as surgical castration, since it, too, drastically
reduces testosterone levels. There is some evidence that this is the case; for
example, some clinicians have reported that paraphiliacs who underwent
chemical castration reported a significant reduction in sexual fantasies and
sexual urges.9 7 But the data does not clearly indicate that these reductions
translate into a long-term reduction in recidivism. Studies of the effect of
chemical castration on paraphiliacs have been largely characterized by
88. Fitzgerald, supra n. 15, at 6-7.
89. Id. at 3.
90. Bailey & Greenberg, supra n. 15, at 1229-30.
91. Id. at 1232.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1234.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 1230 (noting that twenty studies of surgically castrated sex offenders, which
collectively covered approximately 5,000 offenders, indicated an average recidivism rate of 3%);
Rosler & Witztum, supra n. 38, at 43 ("Among a series of 11 reports from Denmark, Germany,
Sweden, Norway, Holland, Switzerland, and Czechoslovakia, the mean recidivism rate for a total
of 3,589 castrated men was 2.2%.").
97. See Stone et al., supra n. 54, at 97 (noting reported "reductions in waking-time preoccu-
pation with sexual fantasies, number of morning erections per week, number of ejaculations per
week, plasma T levels, and frequency of paraphilic behaviors").
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small sample size, lack of controls, and short follow-up periods.98 Moreo-
ver, these studies have reported a wide variety of recidivism rates, ranging
from 0% to 83%. 99 Indeed, preliminary results from Oregon's program of
mandatory chemical castration demonstrate no differences in recidivism be-
tween offenders who underwent chemical castration and those who did
not."mo Several studies indicate that cognitive-behavioral therapy is as effec-
tive as chemical castration in preventing recidivism.10'
One reason that MPA's effect on recidivism has been difficult to mea-
sure is that MPA treatment programs have a high drop-out rate due to the
severe side effects.10 2 Once a sex offender ceases MPA treatment, sexual
urges and fantasies-including deviant ones-appear to return.' 3 Thus, all
other things being equal, offenders who stop receiving MPA become just as
likely to re-offend as they were before the treatment.'
4
The most significant side effect of MPA treatment appears to be loss
of bone mineral density. On November 14, 2004, Pfizer added a "black box
warning" to the drug label, stating that prolonged use could result in a sig-
98. See Maletzky & Field, supra n. 45, at 398-400 (describing studies).
99. See id.; R6sler & Witztum, supra n. 38, at 47 (noting that "[i]n a recent review that
summarized 334 patients from 11 studies recidivism during MPA treatment ranged from 3 to 83%,
with a mean of 27%").
100. Maletzky & Field, supra n. 45, at 406.
101. See e.g. Gordon C. Nagayama Hall, Sexual Offender Recidivism Revisited: A Meta-Anal-
ysis of Recent Treatment Studies, 63 J. Consulting & Clinical Psychol. 802, 807 (1995) (noting
that cognitive-behavioral therapy and hormonal treatment programs-i.e., chemical castration-
achieved a reduction in recidivism of approximately 30%); Wood et al., supra n. 47, at 36 (sum-
marizing results of several studies indicating similar success rates for cognitive-behavioral therapy
and hormonal therapy).
102. Hall, supra n. 101, at 807 (noting that the high drop-out rate for chemical castration
programs may explain why such programs are no more effective than cognitive-behavioral thera-
pies). Furthermore, it must be noted that these studies involved offenders who volunteered for
treatment. It is not at all clear that coercively imposed chemical castration will have a similar
effect on recidivism.
103. Fitzgerald, supra n. 15, at 7.
104. A bizarre and tragic case that occurred in the late 1990s illustrates the danger involved in
ceasing MPA treatment. In 1983, Joseph Frank Smith was convicted of twice raping the same
woman in her home (he was caught during his attempt to victimize her a third time). His crime
received great media attention, in part because his habit of committing the crime wearing nothing
but a ski mask had earned him the nickname "the Ski Mask Rapist." The court sentenced him to
thirty days in prison and ten years of probation, during which period he was to be chemically
castrated. He moved to Virginia and started receiving treatment at Johns Hopkins. His initial
response to the treatment seemed so good that he was profiled on 60 Minutes. But probation
officials did not adequately monitor his treatment, and did not object when he was discharged.
After treatment ceased, he returned to his prior ways, attempting to sodomize a five-year-old girl,
and apparently peering or breaking into dozens of homes wearing nothing but a bandanna (a habit
that earned him the nickname "the Bandanna Bandit"). In perhaps the strangest twist, Smith mar-
ried the nurse who had administered his chemical castration shots, and had two daughters with
her. Smith was finally arrested when his wife caught him masturbating in the presence of his
daughter and friend, both of whom were asleep. See Craig Timberg, Rapist's Life Stirs Doubt
About Drug Treatment, Washington Post (Dec. 6, 1998).
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nificant reduction in bone mineral density," 5 a condition that can lead to
osteoporosis or bone fracture. The label further warns that "[blone loss is
greater with increasing duration of use and may not be completely revers-
ible."' 06 Therefore, even when being administered for its FDA-approved
use as a contraceptive, Depo-Provera should not be used over the "long-
term"-meaning more than two years-unless there is no other option.'° 7
Other side effects of MPA treatment include "excessive weight gain,
malaise, nightmares, headaches, muscular cramps, dyspepsia, gallstones, di-
abetes mellitus . . . [and] [p]ulmonary embolism."' 0 8 MPA treatment also
results in testicular atrophy," 9 and a dramatic reduction in spontaneous
erections and in sperm production.' 0 It is not clear that these side effects
are all reversible-particularly the loss of bone mineral density, which ap-
pears to be at least partly irreversible."' The long-term effects of MPA
treatment on men are unknown)' 2
As with surgical castration, many doctors refuse to prescribe MPA for
the purpose of chemically castrating sex offenders, in part because of the
severe side effects, and in part because it is a chemical form of maiming." 3
The American Medical Association opposes the procedure where it is im-
posed by a judge as part of a criminal sentence, rather than prescribed by a
physician for the purpose of treating a diagnosed medical condition." 4
105. U.S. Food & Drug Administration, Black Box Warning Added Concerning Long-Term
Use of Depo-Provera Contraceptive Injection, http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/2004/
ANS01325.html (Nov. 17, 2004).
106. FDA Label, supra n. 72.
107. Id.
108. Rosler & Witztum, supra n. 38, at 47; see also Saleh & Berlin, supra n. 73, at 241
("MPA can cause a number of potentially serious and less serious adverse effects, including de-
pressive symptoms, breast tenderness and galactorrhea ... weight gain-apparently secondarily to
increased fat deposition ... nausea, abdominal pain, nightmares, hot flashes, acne, alopecia [hair
loss], hirsutism, hyperglycemia, diabetes mellitus, gallstones . . . hypogonadism, hypos-
permatogenesis, and hypertension"); Stone et al., supra n. 54, at 97 ("Side effects include weight
gain, fatigue, depression, hot and cold flushes, elevated blood glucose, nausea and gynecomastia,
and reduction of spermatogenesis.").
109. See Fitzgerald, supra n. 15, at 6-7.
110. Saleh & Berlin, supra n. 73, at 24i (noting that MPA "decreases spermatogenesis");
Stone et al., supra n. 54, at 96 (chemical castration has the effect of "decreasing morning erec-
tions, ejaculation, and spermato-genesis"); Fitzgerald, supra n. 15, at 6-7 (chemical castration
results in "dramatic decrease in sperm count").
111. See FDA Label, supra n. 72 (noting that at least some of the bone mineral density loss
experienced by women appeared to be irreversible).
112. Fitzgerald, supra n. 15, at 9.
113. Maletzky & Field, supra n. 45, at 399.
114. See Am. Med. Assn., Council on Ethical & Jud. Affairs, Court-Initiated Medical Treat-
ments in Criminal Cases, Rpt. 4-A-98 (1998); See also AMA Code of Med. Ethics, Court-Initi-
ated Medical Treatments in Criminal Cases, E-2.065 (1998).
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II. CHEMICAL CASTRATION LAWS
A. The Politics of Castration
On September 17, 1996, Governor Pete Wilson of California approved
the nation's first chemical castration law. This law requires that certain sex
offenders undergo chemical castration via MPA or its chemical equivalent.
Governor Wilson's public statements during the signing ceremony revealed
much about the politics and purposes of this law. First, Wilson described
sex offenders as an enemy with whom we are at war: "I have a message for
those skulking in the shadows. You better stay in the shadows or leave this
state, because we will not tolerate your conduct .... We are going to win
this fight. We are not going to concede one inch of any playground in any
neighborhood to vicious predators.""1 5 Later in the same ceremony, how-
ever, he described sex offenders as victims of an illness: "Child molesters
can't stop because they have a compulsion to do what they do .... And as
long as they have that urge, they'll keep on victimizing children-unless we
do something about it."'1 16
The Governor's message reflects the dual nature of the public percep-
tion of sex offenders. On the one hand, sex offenders are often portrayed as
"vicious predators," depraved criminals who have no conscience, and who
will not stop victimizing children until we make them stop. On the other
hand, they are often described as suffering from a compulsive sexual disor-
der such as pedophilia. They may want to stop victimizing children, but
they cannot resist their compulsion to do so. Although these two views of
sex offenders are in tension, they are often presented together, in a way that
tends to reinforce the perception of sex offender dangerousness. Evil people
may be deterred by the threat of punishment, and sick people may seek
treatment for their illness. But those who, like sex offenders, seem to em-
body a kind of "perfect storm" of illness and evil may seem beyond the
reach of normal modes of punishment or treatment. The appeal of chemical
castration, therefore, arises from its perceived ability to go beyond the nor-
mal modes by simultaneously treating and punishing sex offenders, elimi-
nating their sexual compulsion while exacting a particularly severe kind of
retribution.
Chemical castration seems to promise one further benefit, perhaps the
most powerful of all: it should incapacitate sex offenders, making them in-
capable of committing future sex offenses. The intended purpose and effect
of chemical castration is to eliminate the sex drive by drastically reducing
the offender's desire and capacity to engage in any form of sexual activity.
115. Wilson in Van Nuys to Sign Chemical Castration Bill for Child Molesters, City News
Serv. (L.A., Cal.) (Sept. 17, 1996) (available at LEXIS, News & Bus., Individual Publications
folder, City News Serv. file).
116. Wilson Signs Chemical Castration Bill, United Press Intl. (D.C.) (Sept.17, 1996) (availa-
ble at LEXIS, News & Bus., Individual Publications folder, UPI file).
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Whether the offender has a sexual disorder, is an evil or antisocial person,
or has some combination of these qualities, chemical castration seems to
promise to render him safe, and at considerably less expense than housing
him in a prison or secure mental health facility."t 7
B. Key Features of Chemical Castration Laws
1. California-Style Statutes
California's chemical castration law was both the first in the nation,
and the model for most of the chemical castration laws that followed it. In
California, one becomes eligible for chemical castration by committing (or
aiding and abetting another in committing) one of several forms of forcible
or statutory rape upon a victim who is 12 years old or younger.'"8 After a
first offense, the court has discretion to order chemical castration as a con-
dition of parole;'1 9 after a second offense, it becomes mandatory.
121
Where a court orders chemical castration, California law requires the
administration of MPA or its equivalent.' 21 The treatment is to start one
week prior to the offender's release from confinement (prison or other insti-
tution), and must continue "until the Department of Corrections demon-
strates to the Board of Prison Terms that this treatment is no longer
necessary." ' 22 There is no statutory requirement that a doctor (or any other
medical professional) determine the treatment to be medically appropriate,
or even medically safe; nor is there any requirement that the sex offender be
diagnosed with a sexual disorder. There is no informed consent require-
ment. Although the offender has the right to be informed of the effects of
the treatment, he does not have the right to refuse it.123 A patient can only
escape an order for chemical castration by undergoing a "permanent, surgi-
cal alternative"-i.e., surgical castration.' 2
4
Four states-Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, and Montana-have enacted
chemical castration laws modeled after California's law. 125 Like California,
117. As noted above, given the lack of long-term studies and the high drop-out rate associated
with chemical castration, it is not clear that it actually can deliver on this promise.
118. Cal. Pen. Code Ann. § 645(a)-(c) (West 2006).
119. Id. at § 645(a).
120. Id. at § 645(b).
121. Id. at § 645(a), (b).
122. Id. at § 645(d).
123. Id. at § 645(f).
124. Id. at § 645(e).
125. See Fla. Stat. § 794.0235 (2006); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-4 (repealed 2006); Iowa Code
§ 903B.10 (2006); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:538 (West 2006); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-512
(2006). As noted above, the state of Georgia also enacted a chemical castration law similar to
California's, but the statute was amended in 2006 to remove all references to chemical castration.
The legislative staff working for the amendment's sponsor has indicated that the removal of these
provisions was based on a "policy decision," but has declined to provide the reasons for this
decision.
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these states define eligibility for chemical castration primarily in terms of
the offense of conviction, victim age, and recidivism.
In all four states, as in California, the main criterion for determining
eligibility for chemical castration is conviction for a specified sex offense.
Some statutes include a broad range of offenses, whereas some are much
narrower. For example, Iowa permits chemical castration for crimes ranging
from indecent contact to sexual exploitation of a child,12 6 but Florida per-
mits chemical castration only for sexual battery.1
27
Three of the four states further limit eligibility for chemical castration
to those whose victim is below a certain age. Two states (Iowa and Louisi-
ana) follow California in requiring that the victim be 12 years old or
younger,128 and one (Montana) requires that the victim be 15 years old or
younger. 129
All of these states also give weight to recidivism. Florida and Iowa,
like California, make chemical castration mandatory after a second convic-
tion for a specified sex offense.' 31 In Montana and Louisiana, on the other
hand, those offenders who receive a second conviction for a specified sex
offense become eligible for chemical castration even though their victims
are adults. 3'
In contrast to California, three of the four states require some kind of
minimal medical review before treatment is imposed.' 32 No statute, how-
ever, requires involvement of a physician, nor requires that the sex offender
be diagnosed with a sexual disorder before undergoing chemical castration.
And none of the states require informed consent by the offender. Two states
(Louisiana and Montana) require that the offender be informed of the ef-
fects of the procedure, but do not require consent. 133 The other two states
(Florida and Iowa) do not require that the offender be informed of the ef-
fects of chemical castration; nor do they require consent.
All four states' chemical castration laws require that the treatment be-
gin shortly before the offender is released from prison, and all imply that
treatment should continue, in most cases, for the life of the defendant. Flor-
ida permits the court to order the treatment to continue for any period of
126. Iowa Code § 903B.10(l), (3).
127. Fla. Stat. § 794.0235(l)(a).
128. Iowa Code § 903B.10(3); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:538(C)(1)(a).
129. Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-512(1).
130. Fla. Stat. § 794.0235(1)(b); Iowa Code § 903B.10(1).
131. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:538(C)(1)(b); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-512(2).
132. Fla. Stat. § 794.0235(2)(a); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-4(d)(2) (repealed 2006); La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 538(C)(2)(a)-(b)(i); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-512. Iowa's chemical castration law does
not explicitly require medical review before imposition of chemical castration as a condition of
release, although it does provide for an "assessment" to determine whether chemical castration
would be "effective" before requiring a court to impose chemical castration after a second convic-
tion. Iowa Code Ann. § 903B.10(l).
133. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:538(C)(4); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-512(5).
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time, up to and including the life of the defendant. 134 Two states (Iowa and
Montana) follow California in providing that the treatment should continue
until the state determines it is no longer "necessary. 1 35 Only Louisiana,
which provides that the treatment should continue "during incarceration and
any suspended sentence, probation, or parole, unless it is determined that
the treatment is no longer necessary,"' 136 appears to provide any mandatory
temporal limitation on the administration of MPA treatment. As discussed
above, sexual drive and sexual fantasies (including deviant drives and fanta-
sies) appear to return shortly after MPA treatment ceases; therefore, it is
difficult to imagine a scenario in which the state, after deciding that an
offender needed chemical castration, would later decide that it was "no
longer necessary." Therefore, in most cases, the offender will be subjected
to a life term of chemical castration.
Three states (Florida, Iowa and Louisiana) follow California in permit-
ting offenders to avoid chemical castration by undergoing surgical castra-
tion. 137 Two states (Iowa and Louisiana) require the offender to pay the
costs associated with MPA treatment.' 38
2. The Oregon Approach
In contrast to the California-style statutes, Oregon's chemical castra-
tion law does not call for imposition of this treatment as part of an of-
fender's sentence. Rather, the Oregon law calls for the establishment of a
"pilot program" for determining the efficacy of chemical castration in
preventing recidivism. 39 Under this program, the Department of Correc-
tions is supposed to choose forty to fifty persons to undergo "hormone or
antiandrogen, such as medroxyprogesterone acetate, treatment."'140
The statutory criteria for identifying candidates for this treatment are:
(a) they must have been convicted of a "sex crime," (b) they must be within
six months of release, and (c) the Department of Corrections must deter-
mine that they are "most likely to benefit" from chemical castration. 4' Af-
ter the candidates are selected, they must be referred to a physician to assure
that chemical castration is not "medically contraindicated."' 42 The candi-
dates who make it through this screening process are then required to un-
dergo chemical castration as a mandatory condition of parole or post-prison
supervision.14'3 Although the offender has a right to be informed of the ef-
134. Fla. Stat. § 794.0235(2)(a).
135. Iowa Code § 903B.10(4); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-512(4).
136. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:538(C)(3)(d).
137. Fla. Stat. § 794.0235(1)(b); Iowa Code § 903B.10(1); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 15:538(C)(8).
138. Iowa Code Ann. § 903B.10(5); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:538(C)(5).
139. Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 144.625(1) (2006).
140. Id.
141. Id. at § 144.625(2)(a)-(b).
142. Id. at § 144.625(2)(c).
143. Id. at § 144.625(3).
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fects of the treatment, he does not have the right to withhold consent."4'
The offender must pay for the treatment himself,'45 and must continue the
treatment during "all or a portion of parole or post-prison supervision." 146
3. The Wisconsin Approach
The Wisconsin chemical castration law is much broader and more
standardless than the laws enacted in other states. It contains two basic
components: First, it permits the Department of Corrections and the Parole
Commission to require that a "serious child sex offender"-that is, a person
who has been convicted of sexual assault on a child under the age of
13 '47-undergo chemical castration as a condition of probation or pa-
role.148 Second, it requires that before a court grants a petition for release
from civil commitment under Wisconsin's Sexually Violent Persons Com-
mitment Act, it must order the Department of Corrections to put together a
treatment plan that addresses the offender's "need" for chemical castration
after release.' 49 In both the parole and the civil commitment settings, the
decision to release must be made independently of the decision to chemi-
cally castrate; the fact that an offender is willing to be chemically castrated,
or is an appropriate candidate, should not be counted in his favor. 15
0
4. The Texas Approach (Voluntary Surgical Castration)
In stark contrast to the seven "chemical castration" states, Texas per-
mits certain sex offenders to obtain surgical castration on a purely volun-
tary basis.' 5 ' To be eligible for this surgery, the offender must meet all of
the following criteria: (1) he must have been convicted at least twice of
indecency with a child, sexual assault of a child, or aggravated sexual as-
sault; (2) he must be at least 21 years old; (3) he must request the procedure
in writing; (4) he must admit to his last crime in writing; (5) he must receive
an evaluation and counseling from both a psychiatrist and a psychologist,
both of whom must have experience dealing with sex offenders; (6) he must
give written, informed consent; and (7) he must not have previously re-
quested the procedure and then withdrawn the request.
52
As an added layer of protection, the inmate is also required to meet
with an independent monitor with expertise in mental health, law, and eth-
144. Id. at § 144.627(1)(a).
145. Id. at § 144.629.
146. Id. at § 144.625(3).
147. Wis. Stat. § 304.06(lq)(a) (2006).
148. Id. at § 304.06(lq)(b).
149. Id. at § 980.08(5). Proposed legislation may repeal Wis. Stat. § 980.08(5). See Wis. As-
sembly 1901, 97th Leg., 2005-2006 Reg. Sess. § 121 (Mar. 7, 2006).
150. Id. at §§ 304.06(1q)(c), 980.08(4)(c).
151. Tex. Govt. Code Ann. § 501.061 (West 2006).
152. Id. at § 501.061(a)(1)-(7).
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ics.153 The monitor is required to perform two basic functions: (1) ensure
that the inmate has received adequate information about the orchiectomy,
and provide him with supplemental information if necessary; and (2) deter-
mine whether the inmate has been coerced into requesting the procedure,
and advise him to withdraw his request if the monitor believes he has been
coerced.' 54 Additionally, the inmate is permitted to withdraw his request
any time prior to surgery, but may not renew the request once it has been
withdrawn. 155
The Texas statute does not provide any benefit to the inmate, such as
early release, as a quid pro quo for undergoing surgical castration. Moreo-
ver, judges and the parole panel are specifically forbidden from requiring a
sex offender to undergo an orchiectomy as a condition of community super-
vision or parole.' 56
C. Implementation and Continuing Politics
1. Implementation Issues-Florida and Oregon
Information concerning attempts to implement the chemical castration
statutes appears to be available only for Florida and Oregon. The experience
of those two states, however, indicates a number of serious difficulties asso-
ciated with the imposition of chemical castration sentences.
As of April 2005, less than 10% of the Florida sex offenders who were
statutorily required to receive sentences of chemical castration had actually
received such sentences, largely because many judges and lawmakers are
not aware of the existence of the chemical castration law."' Florida courts
have also had significant difficulty complying with statutory requirements
for imposing sentences under this law.' 58
Florida's experience reveals a number of issues surrounding the medi-
cal review requirement most chemical castration statutes mandate. As noted
above, Florida law requires that a "court appointed medical expert" deter-
mine, within sixty days of sentencing, that the defendant "is an appropriate
153. Id. at § 501.061(a)(8), (f).
154. Id. at § 501.061(0.
155. Id. at § 501.061(b).
156. Tex. Govt. Code Ann. § 508.226; Tex. Crim. Pro. Ann. art. 42.12 § I I(f) (West 2006).
157. Larry Keller, Chemical Procedure for Sex Offender Weighed, Palm Beach Post lB (Aug.
30, 2005) (describing Florida Department of Corrections data regarding enforcement of chemical
castration laws).
158. See Jackson, 907 So. 2d 696 (overturning chemical castration sentence because medical
review did not occur within sixty days of sentence and because judge failed to specify duration of
sentence); Dept. of Corrections v. Cosme, 917 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 5th Dist. App. 2006) (overturning
district court's order requiring Department of Corrections to identify and pay for medical expert to
determine defendant's fitness for chemical castration); Houston, 852 So. 2d 425 (overturning
chemical castration sentence because judge did not appoint a medical expert and did not specify a
duration for the sentence).
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candidate for treatment." '159 Jackson v. State of Florida6° is the only re-
ported case that provides a description of this "medical review" in practice.
There, the Florida Department of Corrections faxed to the sentencing court
a document indicating that "a medical examination" of the defendant indi-
cated that the defendant "'had no symptoms or problems' relative to"
chemical castration.' 61 On the basis of this document, the court ordered the
defendant to undergo chemical castration after serving concurrent sentences
of life imprisonment and fifteen years imprisonment. 162 The appellate court
reversed the sentence, however, because the medical review did not occur
within sixty days of the imposition of sentence.16 3
Although one case is certainly not sufficient to show a consistent prac-
tice, Jackson does reveal certain issues and ambiguities surrounding Flor-
ida's "medical review" requirement (and, by implication, the medical
review provisions in the other "California-style" statutes). First, it is not
clear who the "medical expert" should be. In Jackson, this "expert" appears
to have been part of the medical staff at the Department of Corrections-
possibly a doctor, but possibly not. Second, the statute sets no criteria for
determining who is an "appropriate candidate" for chemical castration. In
Jackson, the medical review was apparently limited to determining whether
the defendant could physically tolerate the MPA treatment. There seems to
have been no attempt to determine whether he had paraphilia, which is the
only male condition for which MPA has been shown to have therapeutic
value. Third, the statute requires that the medical review occur close to the
time of sentencing, but the treatment is not supposed to begin until a week
prior to release. Thus, there will often be a gap of many years, or even
decades, between medical review and treatment. Under such circumstances,
even a mere determination that the defendant can physically tolerate the
medication will no longer be valid at the time treatment commences. The
statute does not call for any subsequent medical review at the time treat-
ment starts, nor any ongoing assessment during the time treatment
continues.
In contrast to Florida, Oregon has made a significant effort to develop
screening criteria to identify those offenders who should receive chemical
castration. The criteria Oregon has chosen, however, are troubling in their
own way. The Oregon program uses "three independent screening criteria"
to determine who should be chemically castrated: (1) risk to re-offend; (2)
presence of a central nervous system dysfunction, such as a developmental
disability (because the presence of such a dysfunction in a person who has
committed a sex offense is thought to increase the likelihood of recidivism);
159. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 794.0235(2)(a).
160. 907 So. 2d 696.
161. Id. at 697.
162. Id. at 696-97.
163. Id. at 697.
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and (3) referral from prison counselors, parole officers, or other state offi-
cials."64 Using these criteria as a benchmark, those offenders who are con-
sidered particularly dangerous are recommended for chemical castration.
Oregon's criteria for implementing chemical castration are based
purely on risk assessment, rather than diagnosis of a sexual disorder. As
discussed above, many (if not most) "high-risk" sex offenders do not have
any kind of sexual disorder; rather, the majority have at least some charac-
teristics associated with an antisocial orientation or personality. But MPA
treatment has only been tested and shown to have therapeutic value for
offenders diagnosed with a form of paraphilia. Specifically, it is supposed
to help paraphiliacs control persistent, deviant sexual urges and fantasies.
By focusing exclusively on risk, Oregon's program will impose chemical
castration on many people who do not have a sexual disorder, but are anti-
social-that is, people who commit sex crimes because of a general willing-
ness to violate the rights of others. MPA treatment may successfully
incapacitate this group by eliminating their (healthy) sex drives; but it is not
even arguably medically appropriate.
As of November 1, 2001, Oregon's program demonstrated little differ-
ence in recidivism among those offenders who received chemical castration
and those who did not.' 65 No one from either group of offenders had yet
been recharged with a sexual offense, a fact that may be attributed to small
sample size and relatively short follow-up period (two years or less for all
offenders).' 66 More significantly, preliminary results indicated that chemi-
cal castration had no effect on nonsexual recidivism.' 67 Nearly the same
percentage of chemically castrated offenders (50%) had nonsexual proba-
tion violations as untreated offenders (48.4%). 168 To the extent that nonsex-
ual crime reflects antisocial orientation, it appears that chemical castration
has no effect on this orientation.1 69
Oregon has had significant difficulty in implementing its chemical cas-
tration program. As of 2002, 15 of the 42 sex offenders who had been rec-
ommended for chemical castration had not yet received it.' 70 Two major
reasons for this problem were that the offenders could not afford the treat-
ment, or could not find a doctor willing to prescribe MPA for purposes of
chemical castration. 171
164. Maletzky & Field, supra n. 45, at 405.
165. Id. at 406.
166. Id. at 405-06.
167. Id. at 406-07.
168. Id. at 406.
169. This result is consistent with studies showing that sex offenders who are antisocial tend
to have a long history of nonsexual crimes, whereas paraphiliacs typically do not. See generally
e.g. Simon, supra n. 50, at 294.
170. Maletzky & Field, supra n. 45, at 405.
171. Id. Two offenders simply refused treatment. id. at 406. It is not clear whether they were
reincarcerated for their refusal.
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2. Continuing Politics of Castration
Despite the manifest difficulties in implementing the chemical castra-
tion laws, and despite the lack of any evidence that they have been effective
in furthering public safety, there is nonetheless a consistent push to enact
such laws in other states. Every year, several states consider enacting a
chemical castration law. 172 Moreover, within the past year, Virginia, Ala-
bama, and Kentucky have considered laws that would permit imposition of
surgical castration on sex offenders.173 Such laws enjoy continued popular-
ity because they promise to protect public safety by disabling convicted
offenders and deterring would-be offenders, all at much less cost than incar-
ceration or civil commitment. Until the unconstitutionality of these laws is
determined with certainty, they will be an increasingly common feature of
the political landscape.
1I. CHEMICAL CASTRATION AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion prohibit federal and state' 74 governments from inflicting "cruel and
unusual punishments" on those convicted of crime.' 7 5 Although the Su-
preme Court has never comprehensively defined what it means for a pun-
ishment to be "cruel and unusual,"' 7 6 it has repeatedly declared that the
main purpose of this clause is to prevent the government from imposing
172. Recent examples of states that have considered proposals for chemical castration laws
include Minnesota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Vermont. See e.g. Rachel E. Stassen-Berger,
Chemical Castration Proposed-Measure Makes It a Sentence for Pedophiles Whose Victims are
Younger Than 13, Pioneer Press (St. Paul, Minn.) A18 (Feb. 18, 2005); Kelley Chambers, Chemi-
cal Castration, Corrections Bills Begin Oklahoma Senate's First Week of Session, J. Rec. Legis.
Rpt. (Okla. City, Okla.) (Feb. 13, 2006); Rebekah Scott, Senator Drafting Legislation to Treat Sex
Offenders with Drug, Pitt. Post-Gaz. (Pa.) (Dec. 22, 2005); Ed Shamy, For Boys, Legislation a
Cut Above, Burlington Free Press (Vt.) 1B (Jan. 31, 2006).
173. See e.g. Tanmie Smith, Castration Bill Delayed a Year; Crime Commission Will Be
Asked to Study Sex-Predator Measure, Richmond Times-Dispatch 2A (Feb. 10, 2006); Alabama:
First We'll Castrate 'Em, Then We'll Kill 'Em, Then; We'll Castrate 'Em Again!, Hotline, Natil.
Journal's Daily Briefing on Politics (D.C.) (July 27, 2005); Lt. Gov. Pence Commits to Strength-
ening Kentucky Sexual Offender Laws, U.S. Sts. News (Sept. 20, 2005).
174. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments has been incor-
porated into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and is applicable to the states.
See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667 (state punishment for narcotics addiction "inflicts a cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment"); cf La. ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) ("The traditional humanity of modem Anglo-American law
forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain in the execution of the death sentence. Prohibition
against the wanton infliction of pain has come into our law from the Bill of Rights of 1688. The
identical words appear in our Eighth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment would prohibit, by
its due process clause, execution by a state in a cruel manner.").
175. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
176. See e.g. Furman, 408 U.S. at 258 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause... is not susceptible of precise definition."); Weems, 217 U.S. at 368 ("What
constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment has not been exactly decided."); Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at
135-36 ("Difficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitu-
tional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted.").
20061
HeinOnline  -- 3 U. St. Thomas L. J. 585 2005-2006
UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL
punishments that deny or violate human dignity."' In Part III A, I will
describe what the concept of human dignity means in the context of the
Eighth Amendment, and show how it has shaped the parameters of the
Court's jurisprudence with respect to inherently cruel punishments. In Part
III B, I will use the Court's focus on human dignity as a lens for examining
the constitutionality of the chemical castration laws described above.
A. Cruelty and Human Dignity
All punishment involves the deliberate infliction of pain,' 7 8 but not all
punishments are cruel within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Ac-
cording to the Oxford English Dictionary, an action is "cruel" if it shows
"indifference to or pleasure in another's distress."' 79 Similarly, the Supreme
Court has often stated that punishment is unconstitutionally cruel if it in-
volves "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,"'181 terror,1 8' dis-
grace, 1 82 or degradation. 83
These definitions imply that the line between non-cruelty and cruelty
depends, in part, on the attitude of those who impose punishment toward
those who receive it. A punishment that is calculated to maximize the of-
fender's suffering as an end in itself, or that treats such suffering as an
unimportant matter, is cruel because it implies that the offender is not a
proper subject of our concern as fellow persons. This idea was developed
most fully in Justice Brennan's concurrence in Furman v. Georgia:
The barbaric punishments condemned by history, "punishments
which inflict torture, such as the rack, the thumb-screw, the iron
boot, the stretching of limbs, and the like," are, of course, "at-
tended with acute pain and suffering." When we consider why
they have been condemned, however, we realize that the pain in-
volved is not the only reason. The true significance of these pun-
ishments is that they treat members of the human race as
nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded. They are
thus inconsistent with the fundamental premise of the Clause that
even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of com-
mon human dignity. 84
177. See supra n. 22 and cases cited therein.
178. Indeed, the words "punishment" and "pain" derive from the Latin word poena, which
refers to the imposition of a fine or other penalty in retribution for an offense. See U. of Notre
Dame, Latin Dictionary and Grammar Aid, "Poena," http://catholic.archives.nd.edu/cgi-bin/
lookit.pl?latin=poena (accessed Sept. 16, 2006).
179. Oxford English Dictionary.
180. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173. See also e.g. Hope, 536 U.S. 730; Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 834 (1994).
181. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135.
182. Id.
183. Weems, 217 U.S. at 366.
184. Furman, 408 U.S. at 272-73.
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As this passage indicates, the Eighth Amendment is predicated upon the
belief that human beings do not forfeit their place in the human community
by committing crimes, even heinous ones. The offender remains entitled to
the respect and concern that is owed to all human beings, even if he also
deserves severe punishment. Therefore, the state is not free to dispose of
him as it will, but must instead punish him in a manner that accords with
the inherent and inalienable dignity of human persons.
The idea that even the worst criminals retain intrinsic human dignity
and worth is a departure from the traditional notion that criminals may for-
feit their place in the human community through the commission of serious
crime. For example, Thomas Aquinas justified capital punishment on the
ground that those guilty of serious sin have discarded their dignity and be-
come like beasts:
By sinning man departs from the order of reason, and conse-
quently falls away from the dignity of his manhood, in so far as
he is naturally free, and exists for himself, and he falls into the
slavish state of the beasts, by being disposed of according as he is
useful to others .... Hence, although it be evil in itself to kill a
man so long as he preserve his dignity, yet it may be good to kill
a man who has sinned, even as it is to kill a beast. For a bad man
is worse than a beast, and is more harmful, as the Philosopher
[Aristotle] states. 85
The Eighth Amendment rejects this notion, holding that even serious
criminals retain the dignity that is inalienably associated with personhood,
and thus retain the right to be punished in accordance with their nature as
human persons.
The Supreme Court has employed the concept of human dignity as an
Eighth Amendment limit on the state's power to punish in three related
contexts. First, the Court has held that punishments that assault the per-
sonhood of the defendant, or inflict harm for harm's sake, are inherently
cruel and unusual.' 86 Second, the Court has held that the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments deprive the state of the power to impose criminal pun-
ishment or civil commitment solely on the basis of a person's undesirable
personal characteristics (such as dangerousness).' 87 Finally, the Court has
185. St. Thomas Aquinas, Whether It Is Lawful to Kill Sinners?, in Summa Theologica vol. 2
(Secunda Secunde Partis) 64:2, 1466, 1466-67 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province
trans., Benzinger Bros., Inc. 1947). See also Michael J. Perry, Capital Punishment and the Moral-
ity of Human Rights, 44 J. Cath. Leg. Stud. 1, 15 (2005) (arguing that under traditional Catholic
doctrine, one could forfeit one's human dignity through the commission of serious crime).
186. See infra nn. 188-229.
187. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667-68 (holding that it violates the Eighth and the Fourteenth
Amendments to criminally convict a person based on his status as a drug addict); Kan. v. Crane,
534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002) (holding that the Constitution does not permit civil commitment absent
a finding of mental abnormality and lack of control over dangerous behavior).
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struck down punishments that are not inherently cruel, but are grossly dis-
proportionate to the offense. 88
These three areas of the Court's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence are tied together by the concept of human dignity. Punish-
ment that deliberately inflicts physical harm for harm's sake, or assaults the
offender's personhood, is cruel and unusual because it treats the offender as
a thing whose suffering is unimportant (or affirmatively desirable) rather
than treating him as a member of the human family who deserves our con-
cern-even if he also deserves serious punishment. Similarly, punishment
that is given in the absence of voluntary wrongdoing is cruel and unusual
because it implies that the offender's moral culpability is irrelevant to the
question of whether he deserves punishment. Finally, punishment that is
grossly disproportionate to the offense implies that the offender's moral
culpability is irrelevant to the question of how much punishment he de-
serves. In short, each category of punishment treats the offender as a thing
rather than a person, whose suffering is unimportant, and whose punish-
ment need not be limited by his objective desert. This article will focus on
the first category of cruel and unusual punishment-punishment that is in-
herently cruel.
The Supreme Court has recognized certain types of punishment to be
inherently cruel, and thus constitutionally prohibited. Paradigmatic exam-
ples of cruel punishments include the old English practice of dragging trai-
tors to the place of execution, and (if they were convicted of high treason)
disemboweling them alive, before beheading and quartering them.' 89 Fur-
ther examples include burning offenders alive, 9 ' public dissection, 9 use
of the rack,192 thumbscrews,' 93 hanging in chains,' 94 and (of course) castra-
tion. "'95 Punishments like these, which involve torture and maiming, are
considered inherently cruel, and therefore they are impermissible "always-
and-everywhere." 196
In the twentieth century, the Supreme Court expanded its definition of
inherently cruel punishment to include punishments that degrade or deny
the personhood of the offender, even if they do not involve physical torture.
188. Cf Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977) ('"These decisions recognize that the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause circumscribes the criminal process in three ways: First, it
limits the kinds of punishment that can be imposed on those convicted of crimes . . . second, it
proscribes punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime ... and third, it im-
poses substantive limits on what can be made criminal and punished as such.").
189. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 675.
193. Id.
194. Weems, 217 U.S. at 377.
195. Id.; see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 265 (Brennan, J., concurring).
196. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 349 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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For example, in Weems v. United States,197 the Court held that it violated
the Eighth Amendment to sentence a public official who had been con-
victed of a strict-liability regulatory offense (putting false information on a
government document) to fifteen years imprisonment at "hard and painful
labor," in chains, with no civil rights during confinement and no prospect of
ever escaping official surveillance afterward. These conditions were so se-
vere and degrading198 that they "amaze[d]""'99 the Court, which struck down
the sentence as cruel and unusual.2°
Similarly, in Trop v. Dulles,2"' the Supreme Court held that it violated
the Eighth Amendment to revoke the citizenship of a soldier who received a
dishonorable discharge after conviction for wartime desertion.2 °2 in a plu-
rality opinion, Chief Justice Warren acknowledged that wartime desertion
was a capital offense, and that therefore there could be "no argument that
the penalty of denationalization is excessive in relation to the gravity of the
crime. ' Nonetheless, he held that this punishment subjected the offender
to a "fate forbidden" by the Eighth Amendment. 2 ' Denationalization was,
in some ways, a worse punishment than physical torture, because it in-
volved "the total destruction of the individual's status in organized soci-
ety."'20 5 By losing citizenship, the offender was not merely deprived of
rights, but of "the right to have rights. 2 °6 This left the offender completely
vulnerable: "fair game for the despoiler at home and the oppressor
abroad. 2°7
More recently, the requirement that punishment must accord with ba-
sic notions of human dignity has been upheld in cases regarding unconstitu-
tional prison conditions, excessive use of force by prison officials, and use
of experimental or psychotropic drugs as a means of controlling prisoner
behavior. When imprisoned after conviction for a criminal offense, offend-
ers retain certain civil rights, including the right to free exercise of religion,
free speech, and due process, although these rights may be substantially
curtailed due to the need for prison security.20 8 Prisoners also retain the
197. 217 U.S. at 381-89.
198. Id. at 366 ("No circumstance of degradation is omitted.").
199. Id.
200. Id. at 367 (Weems can also be understood as a "gross disproportionality" case, for the
Court was clearly concerned about the severity of the punishment in relation to the offense: "tilt is
a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense.").
201. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
202. Id. at 87.
203. Id. at 99.
204. Id. at 99.
205. Id. at 101.
206. Id. at 102.
207. Id. at n. 33 (quoting with approval lower court Trop v. Dulles, 239 F.2d 527, 530 (2d Cir.
1957) (Clark, C.J., dissenting)).
208. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523-24 (1984).
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right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.2 °9 The Supreme Court
has stated that the protection of inmate rights and dignity is central to the
overall preservation of a free society: "The continuing guarantee of these
substantial rights to prison inmates is testimony to a belief that the way a
society treats those who have transgressed against it is evidence of the es-
sential character of that society."210
Under federal law, prison inmates are permitted to bring suit against
prison officials for violation of their constitutional rights,211 including the
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.2" In adjudicating such
suits, the Supreme Court has declared that prison officials are obliged to
look after inmate needs for medical care,2 13 personal safety and security, 2 4
nutrition,215 sanitation,21 6 warmth, 1 7 and exercise. 1 8 Indeed, the Court has
gone so far as to hold that prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners
from serious risk of future harm to their health, as may result from pro-
longed exposure to second-hand smoke.21 9 If prison officials act with "de-
liberate indifference '220 to such "identifiable human need[s], ' 221 they may
be held liable for imposing cruel and unusual punishment.
In cases involving the alleged excessive use of force against an inmate,
the Court gives greater deference to prison officials than in cases alleging
unconstitutional prison conditions, because force may often be needed to
maintain order and safety in the. prison environment.2 2 Nonetheless, pris-
oners can maintain a claim that excessive force constitutes cruel and unu-
sual punishment where more than de minimis force was applied
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1996).
212. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105 (1976).
213. Id. at 103-04.
214. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 685-87; cf Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982) ("If it
is cruel and unusual punishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be
unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-who may not be punished at all-in
unsafe conditions."); Fanner, 511 U.S. at 837 ("[A] prison official cannot be found liable under
the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the offi-
cial knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.").
215. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 686-87.
216. Id.
217. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991).
218. Id.; see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981) (holding that practice of
"double ceiling" prison inmates did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment where it "did not
lead to deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation," and did not "increase violence
among inmates or create other conditions intolerable for prison confinement").
219. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993).
220. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104; Wilson, 501 US. at 297; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (holding that
"deliberate indifference" standard is met where "the official knows of and disregards an excessive
risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference").
221. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304.
222. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
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"maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.12 23
Thus, for example, the beating of a handcuffed prisoner by guards can con-
stitute an Eighth Amendment violation even where the beating does not
result in serious injury. 2 4 Similarly, prison guards were found to have vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment where they handcuffed a prisoner to a hitching
post, and thereby "subjected him to a substantial risk of physical harm, to
unnecessary pain caused by the handcuffs and the restricted position of con-
finement for a 7-hour period, to unnecessary exposure to the heat of the sun,
to prolonged thirst and taunting, and to a deprivation of bathroom breaks
that created a risk of particular discomfort and humiliation." '25
Finally, several lower court cases have held that it violates the Eighth
Amendment to use drugs merely to incapacitate inmates, or punish them for
violations of prison rules, even where the drugs are characterized as "aver-
sive therapy" rather than punishment. For example, in Mackey v. Procunier,
a state prisoner who had been sent to a mental health facility for shock
treatment alleged that the hospital gave him injections of a "breath-stopping
and paralyzing fright drug '226 as part of an experiment "to ascertain
whether, by instilling of fright and infliction of pain, accompanied by psy-
chological suggestion, behavior patterns can be affected." '227 The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that these allegations raised "serious constitutional questions
respecting cruel and unusual punishment or impermissible tinkering with
mental processes, 228 and therefore reversed the district court's dismissal of
the complaint. Similarly, in Knecht v. Gillman, an inmate at a mental hospi-
tal alleged that hospital officials used a morphine-based, vomit-inducing
drug as an experimental "aversive stimuli" to change the behavior of in-
mates who violated hospital rules. 2 9 The Eighth Circuit held that this con-
stituted cruel and unusual punishment, at least in the absence of informed
consent from the inmates.23°
In a related context, the Supreme Court has held that it violates the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause to subject prisoners to invol-
untary medication unless two conditions are met: (1) The medication must
be medically appropriate; and (2) the medication must further an overriding
state interest that cannot be satisfied via less intrusive means.2 3 The due
223. Id. at 320-21 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).
224. Hudson, 503 U.S. 1.
225. Hope, 536 U.S. at 738.
226. 477 F.2d 877, 877 (9th Cir. 1973).
227. Id. at 878.
228. Id.
229. 488 F.2d 1136, 1140 (8th Cir. 1973).
230. Id.
231. Riggins v. Nev., 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992); Wash. v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); cf.
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1980) ("A criminal conviction and sentence of imprison-
ment extinguish an individual's right to freedom from confinement for the term of his sentence,
but they do not authorize the state to classify him as mentally ill and to subject him to involuntary
psychiatric treatment without affording him additional due process protections.").
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process concerns surrounding coercive imposition of medical treatment are
particularly strong with respect to drugs that affect thought processes or
impose severe side effects. As the Fourth Circuit has explained, the coer-
cive imposition of mind-altering drugs to prisoners "has the potential to
allow the government to alter or control thinking and thereby to destroy the
independence of thought and speech so crucial to a free society." '232 Simi-
larly, the coercive imposition of drugs with severe side effects creates a
substantial danger that the state may be imposing cruel punishment in the
guise of "treatment." '233 Therefore, in the absence of consent, coercive med-
ical treatment is only permissible where it is both medically appropriate and
the least intrusive means to achieve an overriding government interest.
In sum, a punishment will be considered inherently cruel if it involves
physical torture or maiming, or constitutes a direct assault on the offender's
dignity and personhood-his "right to have rights." Moreover, cases in-
volving poor prison conditions, excessive use of force, and involuntary
medication confirm that convicted offenders retain the right to be treated in
a manner that accords with human dignity. They retain the right to have
their "basic needs" looked after, including the need for medical care, per-
sonal security, food, warmth, and sanitation. They also retain the right not
to be subjected to the malicious use of force employed for the purpose of
causing needless pain or humiliation. Finally, they retain the right not to be
subjected to involuntary medication for the mere purpose of incapacitation.
When any of these rights are deliberately violated, the state treats offenders
as beings who are less than human, whose suffering is unimportant, and
who may be used (and altered) merely to serve state ends.
B. Is Chemical Castration Cruel and Unusual Punishment?
To determine whether chemical castration (as imposed by the state
laws described above) constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, this article
will consider the following issues in turn: (1) Is chemical castration suffi-
ciently similar to surgical castration to constitute a paradigmatic example of
inherently cruel punishment? (2) To the extent chemical castration differs
232. U.S. v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 489 (4th Cir. 1987) ("The impact of antipsychotic medi-
cation upon the mind may be sufficient to undermine the foundations of personality. Such mind
altering medication has the potential to allow the government to alter or control thinking and
thereby to destroy the independence of thought and speech so crucial to a free society. '[Tihe
power to control men's minds' is 'wholly inconsistent' not only with the 'philosophy of the first
amendment but with virtually any concept of liberty.' ") (internal citations omitted); see also U.S.
v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that antipsychotic drugs affect "cogni-
tion, concentration, behavior, and demeanor .... [and] [w]hile the resulting personality change is
intended to, and often does, eliminate undesirable behaviors, that change also, if unwanted, inter-
feres with a person's self-autonomy, and can impair his or her ability to function in particular
contexts").
233. Washington, 494 U.S. at 241.
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from surgical castration, does it nonetheless deny the offender's right to be
punished in a manner that accords with human dignity?
1. Chemical v. Surgical Castration
Surgical castration is generally considered to be a paradigmatic exam-
ple of cruel and unusual punishment.234 Chemical castration is similar to
surgical castration, in that both procedures drastically reduce the level of
testosterone in the offender's system. By virtually eliminating testosterone,
both procedures largely disable the offender's sex drive, including sexual
desire, performative capacity, and procreative capacity. Chemical castration
differs from surgical castration in two primary ways: it is a pharmacological
rather than surgical procedure, and its sexual effects appear to be reversible
(although at least some of its side effects do not).
To determine whether the similarities between chemical castration and
surgical castration are sufficient to make the two procedures constitution-
ally equivalent, it is first necessary to consider why surgical castration has
been condemned as a paradigmatic example of cruel and unusual
punishment.
American courts have consistently described castration as a classic ex-
ample of cruel and unusual punishment. Indeed, the American Medical As-
sociation has declared it to be unethical for doctors to participate in court-
ordered castration,235 and even the European countries that permitted sex
offenders to undergo castration in exchange for early release up through the
1970s have now largely stopped doing so (despite the dramatic decreases in
recidivism discussed above) because the procedure is considered cruel and
barbaric. 236
234. See supra n. 195 and cases cited therein; see also Whitten v. Ga., 47 Ga. 297 (1872)
(recognizing castration as an inherently cruel form of punishment); In the Matter of the Applica-
tion of Lucas Candido for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, 31 Haw. 982 (1931); St. v. Bartlett, 830 P.2d
823, 830 (1992) (disapproved on other grounds by St. v. DePiano, 926 P.2d 494, 497 (1996))
(recognizing castration as an inherently cruel form of punishment); cf Kenimer v. St. ex rel. Webb,
59 S.E.2d 296, 309 (Ga. App. 1950) (Maclntyre, J., dissenting) (in which the presiding judge
dissented from Court of Appeals ruling that cumulative punishment of three years in prison and an
$11,900 fine for numerous contempt citations was cruel and unusual punishment because it did
not involve an inherently cruel punishment, such as castration).
235. See e.g. Am. Med. Assn. H. of Delegates Policy H-140.955, Court-Ordered Castration
("The AMA opposes physician participation in castration and other surgical or medical treatments
initiated solely for criminal punishment."); Maletzky & Field, supra n. 45, at 395 (stating that
surgeons are "loath to remove undamaged tissue").
236. See Luk Gijs & Louis Gooren, Hormonal and Psychopharmacological Interventions in
the Treatment of Paraphilias: An Update, 33 J. Sex Research 273, 273 (1996); see also Maletzky
& Field, supra n. 45, at 395. One measure of the barbarity of coerced castration may be an
examination of its side effects, which include "changes in metabolic processes; loss of protein;
augmentation of pituitary functions; augmentation of creatinine found in urine; changes in fat
distribution in the body; diminution of the calcium content of bones after a period of time; hot
flashes and sweating; multiple diffuse somatic complaints; and diminishment of beard and body
hair. Additionally, castrates may exhibit a number of mental effects that require consideration;
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Why is this so? Courts and commentators often say that chemical cas-
tration is inherently cruel because it is a kind of mutilation. For example, in
State v. Brown,2 37 the Supreme Court of South Carolina voided a trial
judge's sentencing order that would have permitted three sex offenders to
obtain suspended sentences in exchange for undergoing surgical castration.
This order violated public policy, the Court held, because castration was "a
form of mutilation," and was thus "prohibited" as a cruel and unusual
punishment.2 38
It is not absolutely clear, however, that the Framers intended the
Eighth Amendment to categorically exclude all forms of mutilation. Brand-
ing and the cutting off of ears, for example, were accepted forms of punish-
ment in the colonial period.2 39 Indeed, in the congressional debate over
adoption of the Eighth Amendment, Samuel Livermore objected on the
ground that the Amendment was meaningless:
The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which
account I have no objection to it; but, as it seems to have no
meaning in it, I do not think it necessary. . . . No cruel and unu-
sual punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes necessary to
hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having
their ears cut off; but are we, in future, to be prevented from in-
flicting these punishments because they are cruel?24 °
The very idea that the Eighth Amendment might prohibit such punishments
seemed, to Livermore, to have been ridiculous.
If mutilation alone was not sufficient to mark a punishment as inher-
ently cruel and unusual, what makes castration sufficiently harsh to fall
within this category? One way to think about the issue is to compare the
way the common law treated private parties who committed castration ver-
sus those who committed other forms of mutilation. If castration was pun-
ished more harshly than other forms of mutilation, this may tell us
something about why the government is forbidden by the Eighth Amend-
ment from imposing castration as a form of punishment. According to
Blackstone, at common law, castration was the most serious form of the
crime of mayhem. Mayhem was defined as "the violently depriving another
of the use of such of his members, as may render him the less able in
fighting, either to defend himself, or to annoy his adversary. And therefore
the cutting off, or disabling, or weakening a man's hand or finger, or strik-
ing out his eye or foretooth, or depriving him of those parts, the loss of
which in all animals abates their courage," i.e., the testes, "are held to be
these include depressive reactions, suicidal tcndencies, emotional liability, and indifference to
life." Stone et al., supra n. 54, at 93.
237. 326 S.E.2d 410 (S.C. 1985).
238. Id. at 411.
239. Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History 40 (BasicBooks
1993).
240. Weems, 217 U.S. at 369 (quoting Cong. Register p. 225).
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mayhems. ' ' 41 Other kinds of mutilation, on the other hand, including "the
cutting off his ear, or nose, or the like" were not considered mayhems at
common law.242 Mayhem was considered "an atrocious breach of the king's
peace," and the typical punishment was fine and imprisonment. 243 But those
who committed mayhem by castration were guilty of a capital felony that
could be punished by death or exile, and the forfeiture of one's entire
estate. 24
It appears that, with respect to mutilation, the common law recognized
an ascending scale of seriousness. Simple mutilation was not serious
enough to constitute the "atrocious" crime of mayhem. Mutilation that de-
prived a person of the use of one of his members, and thus made him more
vulnerable in a fight, constituted mayhem punishable by fines and imprison-
ment. Finally, mutilation that deprived a man of his very courage or man-
hood-that is, castration-was a capital offense, treated just as harshly as
murder.
The idea that private parties who subject others to castration were to be
treated in the same manner as murderers, because they had "killed" the
manhood of their victim, is a fairly constant theme in Western culture.24 5
From at least the second century on, Roman law subjected those who cas-
trated others to the same punishment as murderers and poisoners. 246 Simi-
larly, in the thirteenth century, Bracton noted that castration was a capital
offense.24 7 Indeed, even in the antebellum American South, it was consid-
ered a crime for a white person to castrate a slave, although many other
forms of harsh physical abuse were permitted. 24 8 From the perspective of
the common law, then, it appears that castration might be considered cruel
and unusual because it does more than merely mutilate the offender: it dis-
241. Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England vol. 4, ch. 15, 205-06
(William G. Hammond ed., Bancroft-Whitney Co. 1890). The common law crime of mayhem was
also recognized in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America. See e.g. John Wilder May, May's




245. Of course, the powers that be often did not subject themselves to the same limitations.
There are historical examples of emperors and popes employing eunuchs or castrati as guards or
singers. Moreover, throughout Western history, castration was sometimes employed as a criminal
punishment. See Stelzer, supra n. 15, at 1675 n. 6. The Eighth Amendment is a decisive break
from that tradition.
246. See The Digest of Justinian 48.8.4.2 (Alan Watson ed., U. of Pa. Press 1998) ("The same
deified Hadrian wrote in a rescript: 'It is laid down, in order to end the practice of making
eunuchs, that those who are found guilty of this crime are to be liable to the penalty of the lex
Cornelia [covering murderers and poisoners]."').
247. Bracton, De Legibus Et Consuetudinibus Anglia, vol. 2, 408 (George E. Woodbine ed.,
Yale U. Press 1922) ("Sed quid dicetur si quis alterius virilia absciderit, et ilium cum libidinis
causa vel commercii castraverit? Tenetur, sive hoc fecerit volens vel invitus, et sequitur poena,
aliquando capitalis, aliquando perpetuum exilium cum omnium bonorum ademptione.").
248. See St. v. Maner, 20 S.C. 453 (S.C. App. 1834).
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ables one of his key bodily functions, thus robbing him of his "courage" or
manhood.
The results are similar if one examines castration from the perspective
of modem American constitutional law. From the modem perspective, cas-
tration robs the offender of at least three fundamental rights that are integral
to human dignity: the rights to bodily integrity, 49 to procreation, 5 ° and to
freedom of thought.251 Moreover, castration does more than just infringe
these rights; it destroys the offender's very capacity to enjoy them. Just as
denationalization deprived the defendant in Trop of the "right to have
rights," castration deprives the offender of his very capacity to think and
perceive sexually, and to procreate. This is more than mere infringement: it
is assaultive destruction or maiming. No doubt, the fact that castration in-
volves the assaultive destruction of one's sexual nature is the reason that
private individuals were punished like murderers, for castration is, indeed, a
kind of partial killing.
To what extent does chemical castration cause injuries similar to those
imposed by surgical castration? Like surgical castration, it involves an inva-
sion of bodily integrity. Rather than surgically removing a sex organ, chem-
ical castration requires the injection or ingestion of drugs that override that
organ's function. In one sense, this may seem a lesser invasion because it
leaves the organ intact. But it is a greater invasion in the sense that it floods
the system with a drug that not only impairs organ function, but also im-
poses severe side effects and health risks (discussed below).
Does chemical castration rob the offender of his "courage" or man-
hood in the same manner as surgical castration? The answer to this question
will depend, in part, on the manner in which the chemical castration laws
are implemented. Both chemical and surgical castration deprive the body
and brain of testosterone, diminishing or eliminating the offender's ability
to think and perceive in a sexual manner, to engage in sexual activity, and
to procreate. Therefore, for as long as chemical castration lasts, it destroys
the offender's capacity to enjoy the fundamental rights associated with sex-
uality in precisely the same manner as surgical castration.
The only difference between chemical and surgical castration is that
the sexual effects of chemical castration are apparently reversible. But as
249. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo., Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (noting that "[t]he
principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing un-
wanted medical treatment," based in large part on the common law principle of bodily integrity,
"may be inferred from our prior decisions").
250. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
251. See e.g. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144 (D.N.J. 1978) ("The right of privacy is
broad enough to include the right to protect one's mental processes from governmental interfer-
ence."); cf Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000) (quoting with approval the
statement in Justice Brandeis's concurrence in Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927), which
stated that the Founders "believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth").
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noted above, the chemical castration laws appear designed to encourage
life-long sentences for sex offenders. The majority of the statutes only per-
mit the MPA treatment to cease if the offender can show that it is no longer
necessary. But the evidence indicates that when treatment stops, sexual de-
sire returns, and offenders are just as dangerous as they were before they
were treated. It is difficult to imagine a scenario in which a sex offender,
once sentenced to chemical castration, could ever prove that it was no
longer necessary.
The similarities between surgical castration and chemical castration
vastly outweigh the differences, particularly given the likelihood that many
(if not most) offenders who receive it will be effectively given a permanent
disability. If surgical castration is a paradigmatic example of cruel and unu-
sual punishment, then so is chemical castration.
2. Further Characteristics of Chemical Castration
Chemical castration has two additional characteristics that make it in-
herently degrading, and therefore cruel and unusual, above and beyond its
similarities to surgical castration: It exposes the offender to undue health
problems and long-term health risks, and involves administration of a mind-
altering drug purely for purposes of incapacitation (as opposed to medical
treatment). The Supreme Court has held that the government has a duty,
under the Eighth Amendment, not to impose conditions of punishment that
inherently impose a severe risk of harm to the offender's health and physi-
cal well-being.252 Chemical castration subjects sex offenders to severe im-
mediate and long-term physical harm. As noted above, the intended effect
of chemical castration is to impose a severe impairment to body and brain
function, reducing or eliminating the offender's capacity to think, perceive,
or perform sexually. Chemical castration also imposes severe side effects
on many recipients, including testicular atrophy,253 dramatic reduction in
sperm production,"' 4 pulmonary embolisms, diabetes mellitus, depression,
nightmares, weight gain, headaches, muscular cramps, dyspepsia, and
gallstones.255
As the symptoms listed above indicate, chemical castration imposes
severe, immediate detriments to the offender's health, as well as significant
long-term risks. But most significant of all may be its demonstrated impact
on bone mineral density. Pfizer, MPA's manufacturer, has warned women
252. See e.g. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (deliberate indifference to serious medical needs); Hutto,
437 U.S. 678 (personal safety and security); Helling, 509 U.S. 25 (exposure to severe risk of
future health problems).
253. See Fitzgerald, supra n. 15, at 6-7.
254. Saleh & Berlin, supra n. 73, at 241 (noting that MPA "decreases spermatogenesis");
Stone, et al., supra n. 54, at 96 (chemical castration has the effect of "decreasing morning erec-
tions, ejaculation, and spermatogenesis"); Fitzgerald, supra n. 15, at 7 (chemical castration results
in "a dramatic decrease in sperm count").
255. Supra n. 108 (discussing side effects of MPA).
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not to use MPA over the long term (more than two years) because it de-
prives the body-at least partly irreversibly-of bone mineral density, a
loss that could ultimately result in crippling osteoporosis or bone fracture.
Even the most lenient sentence involving chemical castration will likely
require that it be imposed for more than two years. Many offenders will be
required to take MPA for life. Moreover, the dosages given to men are 8 to
43 times greater than the dosages given to women. Therefore, although
there are no long-term studies regarding the health effects of MPA treat-
ment on men, 56 it appears likely that they will be very severe indeed. The
deliberate infliction of such short- and long-term physical suffering on sex
offenders is inconsistent with the idea of human dignity that lies at the heart
of the Eighth Amendment.
Chemical castration is also inconsistent with human dignity because it
imposes pharmacological means to manipulate the thought processes of of-
fenders, and thereby incapacitate them. As the Supreme Court declared in
Trop v. Dulles, "[f]ines, imprisonment and even execution may be imposed
depending on the enormity of the crime, but any technique outside the
bounds of these traditional penalties is constitutionally suspect. ' 57 If the
coercive imposition of medication is not both medically appropriate and
necessary to achieve a compelling government interest, it violates the Four-
teenth Amendment's due process clause. If the medication is imposed
solely to incapacitate the offender, it constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment.
The chemical castration laws do not even arguably provide for "medi-
cally appropriate" treatment. In most states that have chemical castration
laws, the imposition of chemical castration is determined primarily by of-
fense of conviction, age of victim, and recidivism. In Oregon, it is deter-
mined solely on the basis of the commission of a "sex offense" combined
with a determination that the defendant poses a relatively high risk of recid-
ivism. In Wisconsin, the statute prescribes no substantive standards other
than offense of conviction. All states provide for either minimal or no medi-
cal review, usually given years or decades before the treatment actually
starts.
Not one state statute requires a determination that the offender suffer
from a sexual disorder. Indeed, as Florida and Oregon's attempts to imple-
ment their castration laws indicate,258 those responsible for imposing chem-
ical castration on sex offenders appear to be focusing solely on either
offense of conviction, or risk of re-offense, or both. Because there is abso-
lutely no effort to restrict the use of chemical castration to those who have a
sexual disorder, it cannot be justified as a form of medical treatment.
256. See e.g. Saleh & Berlin, supra n. 73, at 240; Fitzgerald, supra n. 15, at 9.
257. 356 U.S. at 100.
258. See supra sec. II.C.1.
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Because the chemical castration laws do not even attempt to adminis-
ter MPA on the basis of medical need, their only purpose must be incapaci-
tation. But it violates the Eighth Amendment to use pharmacological means
to incapacitate defendants. Using medical technology in this manner has the
potential of transforming criminal punishment into mere biological manipu-
lation. This practice is particularly troubling where, as here, the drug being
coercively administered operates directly on the brain. Governmental ma-
nipulation of thought processes is inconsistent with the notion of human
dignity that lies at the base, not only of the Eighth Amendment, but of the
very idea of a free society.
Ironically, the only state that appears to stay within the bounds of the
Eighth Amendment is Texas, which offers the option of surgical rather than
chemical castration. In Texas, castration may be performed only at the insti-
gation of the defendant. The courts and the prison system are forbidden
from either requiring castration as a condition of release, or offering bene-
fits such as early release in exchange for undergoing the operation. Moreo-
ver, several rounds of screening are involved, to ensure the offender has not
been subjected to coercion, and understands the medical, legal, and ethical
implications of the procedure. If the "chemical castration" states adopted
the procedures employed by Texas for surgical castration, there would be
no question as to whether they violated the Eighth Amendment.259
CONCLUSION
The chemical castration laws deny human dignity, and thus violate the
Eighth Amendment, because they treat sex offenders as things rather than
persons, as means to an end rather than ends in themselves. Chemical cas-
tration disables the offender in body and mind, and exposes him to severe
short- and long-term health consequences. Moreover, the avowed purpose
of chemical castration is not to make sex offenders more whole, but to
maim them, and thus incapacitate them. These laws require the imposition
of chemical castration in the absence of any evidence that the offender who
undergoes this procedure even has a sexual disorder, much less a sexual
disorder for which MPA treatment may provide therapeutic value. The
Eighth Amendment does not permit us to maim dangerous offenders in or-
der to render them harmless. Because chemical castration shackles and crip-
ples the body of sex offenders, it should be struck down as a cruel and
unusual punishment.
259. This is not to say that Texas's voluntary surgical castration regime necessarily comports
with human dignity. But because the state neither requires offenders to undergo this procedure nor
rewards them for doing so, the procedure cannot be classified as "punishment" within the meaning
of the Eighth Amendment.
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